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Abstract 
The central questions of this essay all arise from reflections on one particular aspect of 
philosophy, specifically as it presents itself in the philosophical practice of Socrates, Plato and 
Wittgenstein: namely, understanding each other in philosophy. 
The essay is roughly divided into two main parts of equal length. In the first half of the essay, 
I compare certain characteristics of the philosophical methods of Socrates and Plato on the one 
hand with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein on the other. In the second half of the essay, I continue 
my comparison with special regard to questions concerning the teaching, and especially the 
writing, of a Socratic kind of philosophy that arise from several systematic as well as exegetical 
considerations. 
The ‘turning point’ of the text is arrived at in the form of a problem, or paradox, concerning 
the writing of the kind of Socratic philosophy that is central to the discussion. It follows a brief 
survey of different possible and historical attempts to overcome this dilemma. The remainder of 
the essay then proceeds from a comparison of Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s respective dialogical 
writings to a more detailed analysis of the various techniques employed by Wittgenstein in 
composing the text of Philosophical Investigations, resulting in a new interpretation of the 
stretch of remarks on ‘private language’ (§§243 ff.). Finally, in a postscript I offer some 
concluding remarks and also comment on related issues and the current state of philosophical 
writing in academia.  
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Motto 
The topics of the modern, of the philosophy of philosophy, and of the form of 
philosophical writing, come together in the question: What is the audience of philosophy? 
For the answer to this question will contribute to the answer to the questions: What is 
philosophy? How is it to be written? In case a philosopher pretends indifference to this 
question, or not recognize that he has an answer to it, I should note that this question 
intersects the question: What is the teaching of philosophy? Not, of course, that this 
question is likely to seem more attractive to those responsible for teaching it. 
 
(Stanley Cavell: Must we mean what we say? 
A Book of Essays, 1969, xxiii) 
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Introduction 
The title of this essay is likely to make it sound as though the following is going to be another 
one of those self-help ‘how to’ books that we are nowadays bombarded with in bookshops. And 
in a way that’s what it is – only worse, since the author obviously doesn’t know what he is talk-
ing about. For isn’t this supposed to be philosophy? Yet surely the body of this essay couldn’t 
even be close to whatever the author is going to tell us would be the written equivalent to 
Socratic philosophising (I don’t see any dialogues)? Or, if that is what he intends to make us be-
lieve, then how boring it looks; just another useless theory. However, if this is not what he is 
going to say, then again it seems that the author doesn’t know what he is talking (or writing) 
about.—Or could there be a difference between kinds of philosophy, or different ways of writ-
ing philosophy? 
I am not sure how to answer these questions. Partly because I quite simply do not know the 
answers; I have been asking myself these very questions, and I keep on disagreeing with myself. 
Partly because I wouldn’t know which specific person I would be answering (whoever it is that 
might have made the mistake of picking up this essay and reading these lines). I am, of course, 
aware that this essay raises many questions about itself that it can hardly be said to answer or 
even to indicate a clear path towards answering them. But then again, charitably, perhaps this 
will be regarded as a virtue: not to have tried to formulate an answer to a question whose sense 
one hasn’t yet been able to grasp clearly enough. As R. G. Collingwood wrote, ‘If you cannot 
tell what a proposition means unless you know what question it is meant to answer, you will 
mistake its meaning if you make a mistake about that question’ (R. G. Collingwood: An 
Autobiography, 1939, 33). ——— 
The formal structure of the present essay, the reader might be glad to hear, is much less cha-
otic than these introductory words are likely to suggest. A brief synopsis of each of its main 
sections follows: 
In Section 1, I describe certain features of the Socratic method as I find it in Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues. These features, I argue, all stem from the importance of an aspect of Socrates’ 
philosophical practice which ‘standard accounts’ tend to neglect. This is the fact that Socrates 
(seems to have) had philosophical reasons for taking his interlocutors seriously as persons. By 
discussing several examples, I try to illustrate some of the consequences this has for our 
understanding of the Socratic method in general and Plato’s (Socratic) dialogues in particular. 
In Section 2, I first describe similar features in (later) Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
practice. In addition to this, I emphasise a related aspect of his philosophising, and also argue 
that the same can be observed in the case of Socrates. The point of bringing together these two 
How to Write Like Socrates Spoke? Wittgenstein & Plato on Mutual Understanding in Philosophy | 9 
aspects is to show that despite the fact that both Socrates and Wittgenstein understand their 
philosophical approaches as being essentially directed at the particular problems and modes of 
understanding that are unique to single individuals—with the consequence that the understand-
ing of a person is central to their methods—they nevertheless aspire to philosophical 
understanding of the more ‘mundane’ kind that is directed at truth and the world. 
In Section 3, then, against the background of the foregoing sections, I interpret several parts 
of Plato’s dialogues Phaedrus and Laches, the former of which contains an explicit discussion 
of the practice and the teaching of (Socratic) philosophy with regard to the possible media in 
which it can be conducted, while the latter contains an implicit one. In addition, I further de-
velop my case for seeing the role of mutual understanding in philosophy as fundamentally two-
fold, being directed both at the individual and what they say (the word), and at things that are 
‘external’ to this human relation at any particular moment of philosophical understanding (the 
world). 
In Section 4, I develop the problem as described by Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedrus 
concerning writing as a medium for (Socratic) philosophy, and I discuss some of its more gen-
eral outlines as well as potential consequences. Subsequently, I compare Plato’s dialogues and 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations from the point of view of their respective potential 
for success in developing writing techniques which could overcome the problem of writing 
Socratic philosophy. I argue that, in this respect, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are 
a far more elaborate attempt at this task. Section 4.1, finally, is intended to illustrate some of the 
resulting features of this latter text, discussing an exemplary collection of its remarks which at 
the same time might appear to be about the root topic of the present essay, viz. understanding 
(one) another. 
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1 One aspect of the Socratic method 
What is justice? What is friendship? What is good? What is knowledge? What is philosophy? 
Socrates typically elicits from his interlocutor an attempt to express their understanding of 
whatever is at issue in the form of a definition, and proceeds to demonstrate how this definition 
would yield a series of misunderstandings (or contradictions, according to the standard defini-
tion of the elenchus). In the following description of Socrates’ methods I focus on a particular 
aspect of it which, it seems to me, is usually not considered to be of any real importance for its 
understanding.
1
 
A standard account of the Socratic method would usually focus on what we have learnt to 
understand by the elenchus (not that Socrates would ever have used this particular word in 
describing his own method). Gregory Vlastos’ account has become standard in many ways: 
‘Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in 
which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own belief and is regarded as refuted 
                                                     
1
 I do not claim the Socrates presented in this essay to be closer to the historical Socrates than any 
other presentation of ‘Socrates’ (concerning the problem of the historical Socrates see (Dorion 2011)). 
However, saving myself (and you) the hassle of using some sort of index to mark the textual conditions of 
my Socrates—even though I like the sound of ‘Moc(k)rates’—and equally—given the sheer number of 
such pretensions on offer in the literature—not seeing a good reason to make those who do not read this 
footnote not believe that the following is supposed to give a true account of the historical Socrates’ 
methods, I shall continue to call my Socrates simply ‘Socrates’. 
For reasons of accuracy, I should note that the examples of Socrates’ philosophical practice that I 
discuss will almost all be drawn from Plato’s ‘Socratic dialogues’ (following John Cooper’s classification 
according to which ‘the term is understood to make no chronological claims, but rather simply to indicate 
certain broad thematic affinities . . . characteristic of the historical Socrates’ own philosophical 
conversations’ (Cooper 1997a, xv)) where there is general agreement concerning Plato’s authorship (cf. 
(Cooper 1997a, v–vi)), viz. Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Ion, Laches, 
Lesser Hippias, Lysis, Menexenus, Protagoras; significantly fewer examples will be drawn from those 
dialogues where there is no general agreement by scholars concerning Plato’s authorship, viz. Alcibiades, 
Clitophon, Greater Hippias, while no examples will be drawn from those dialogues where there is general 
agreement by scholars that Plato is not the author, viz. Hipparchus, Minos, Rival Lovers, Second 
Alcibiades, Theages. 
By contrast, compare e.g. Hugh Benson (Benson 2011, 179 (n.1)) who, in application of broadly the 
same parameters as Cooper, classifies the following as Socratic dialogues (with no explicit regard to 
scholars’ agreement): Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Greater Hippias, 
Ion, Laches, Lesser Hippias, Lysis, portions of the Meno, Protagoras, Republic I. Like in Gregory Vlastos’ 
classification of Plato’s ‘early dialogues’ (cf. Vlastos 1994a, 135), Benson allows for the Greater Hippias 
to be counted among Plato’s Socratic dialogues. And, curiously, besides adding parts of the ‘transitional’ 
Meno to his Socratic dialogues, the only difference between Vlastos’ ‘early’ and Benson’s ‘Socratic’ 
dialogues is that Benson leaves out the Menexenus without further argument, which is also the only 
dialogue from Cooper’s ‘Socratic’ list that does not appear on Benson’s. Benson probably leaves it out 
because it does not contain an instance of the Socratic elenchus. But this just shows how one-sided a 
criterion ‘use of the elenchus’ would be. One further difference between Cooper’s list on the one hand 
and those of Vlastos and Benson on the other consists in the former’s omission of Republic I which 
appears on both Vlastos’ and Benson’s lists. Presumably, Cooper’s reason for omitting Republic I is that 
he views it as essentially a part of a larger work by Plato – which would make perfectly good sense. 
How to Write Like Socrates Spoke? Wittgenstein & Plato on Mutual Understanding in Philosophy | 11 
only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs’ (Vlastos 1994b, 4).2 It is important, as 
Socrates repeatedly points out, that the answerer gives short answers (e.g. Gorgias 449c). This 
is in order, it is often stressed, that the questioner can stay in control and lead the direction of 
the search and examination.
3
 
The aspect of Socrates’ method that I want to focus on instead has to do with a certain ten-
dency of Socrates to focus his philosophical efforts on particular individuals’ concerns, as ech-
oed in the second half of Vlastos’ short description, ‘a thesis is debated only if asserted as the 
answerer’s own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own 
beliefs’. The way in which Socrates leads his interlocutors to a better understanding and richer 
appreciation of the complex realities of the thing in question usually involves directly address-
ing their individual, personal knowledge, beliefs, preconceptions, etc. (so that, in this sense, the 
one who leads the conversation is actually the answerer, not the questioner).
4
 As Plato has 
Nicias say to Lysimachus in the Laches: 
You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and 
associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing 
about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s 
arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his 
present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this 
questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and 
truly tested every last detail. . . . I realized some time ago that the conversation would [be] 
about ourselves, if Socrates were present. (Laches 187e–188c)5 
In most of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, Socrates leisurely walks up to a person or a group of peo-
ple, then something catches his interest and philosophical discourse unfolds. Socrates does not 
discriminate according to any supposed intellectual expertise, but welcomes conversation with 
‘anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger’ (Apology 30a; see also Apology 
29d); as e.g. in the Charmides when Critias draws Socrates’ attention to the beauty and apparent 
virtuousness of his young cousin, Charmides, who then goes on to examine with Socrates what 
‘temperance’ is;6 or in the Lysis when, having been greeted by young boys in the street, their 
reports of issues concerning love and friendship initiates Socrates’ demonstration of some of the 
                                                     
2
 See (Benson 2011), for instance. 
3
 Cf. the following remark by Vlastos on the translation of ‘elenchus’: ‘First and foremost elenchus is 
search. . . . its object is always that positive outreach for truth which is expressed by words for 
searching . . . , inquiring . . . , investigating’ (Vlastos 1994b, 4). 
4
 See also (Vlastos 1994b, 7 ff.). 
5
 All translations of Platonic dialogues are cited after Plato. Complete Works, edited by John M. 
Cooper (associate editor D. S. Hutchinson), Hackett, 1997. 
6
 The Greek ‘sophrosune’ cannot readily be translated literally. Cooper describes it as meaning ‘a 
well-developed consciousness of oneself and one’s legitimate duties in relation to others (where it will 
involve self-restraint and showing due respect) and in relation to one’s own ambitions, social standing, 
and the relevant expectations as regards one’s own behavior’ (Cooper 1997b, 639). 
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difficulties involved in understanding ‘friendship’ in conversation with Lysis and Menexenus;7 
or in the Menexenus (‘SOCRATES: You at the Council Chamber? Why?’ (234a)) when, on the 
occasion of the council’s postponed election of an orator to speak about Athen’s war dead, 
Socrates criticises, by way of performance, the art of speech-making and speech-giving. 
Socrates is moved by the daily, mundane themes of his fellow citizens. And he digs into 
philosophical mud which his interlocutors had not realised they were already half-sunk into, 
discovering together with them the intricate depths of their unexamined beliefs and related 
prejudices (namely – in some cases, significantly – both those of his interlocutors and those of 
Socrates himself (cf. e.g. the ending of the Laches; see also Apology 28a)).
8
 
For example, it can be argued that Socrates’ primary interest in his discussion with 
Euthyphro, whom Socrates happens to meet on his way to court, is not the general concept 
‘piety’ (contra (Geach 1966), for example), nor to prove or disprove the Delphic oracle (contra 
(Benson 2011)), but Euthyphro’s legal case against his own father and how Euthyphro ought to 
act under such extraordinary circumstances. As the conversation develops, it appears to Socrates 
that Euthyphro is suffering from serious misconceptions concerning notions such as ‘piety’ and 
‘justice’, and that these misconceptions stand in the way of Euthyphro’s seeing clearly relevant 
implications of his legal case. Hence, Socrates challenges Euthyphro to re-examine some of his 
preconceived ideas – successfully, until Euthyphro escapes the continued self-examination 
(‘like Proteus’?), excusing himself (‘I am in a hurry now’) just when Socrates summarises, ‘So 
we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is’. And it is certainly possible, or this 
might be Plato’s suggestion, that Euthyphro has just had enough of Socrates’ midwifery, and 
thus hurries back into court to retract the charges which he had brought against his own father 
just before he met Socrates, finding truth in Socrates’ concluding words: ‘If you had no clear 
knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for 
murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk 
lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men’ (15d–e). — 
When read in this way, the dialogue can actually be seen not to end abruptly (as is often said), 
nor simply in aporia, but as marking the appropriate end as achieved by Socrates in successfully 
moving Euthyphro’s practical reason.9 
                                                     
7
 As Cooper notes, ‘The Greek word . . . philia . . . in this discussion includes the love of parents and 
children and other relatives, as well as the close elective attachments of what we understand as personal 
friendship. It also covers impassioned, erotic fixations’ (Cooper 1997b, 687). 
8
 On the question of whether it is necessary (or sufficient, or both) for Socrates’ interlocutors to have a 
conscious and determinate belief in the examined contents for the method to work, see the well-argued 
negative reply in (Benson 2011, 187–193). 
9
 However cf., by way of contrast, Cooper, who presents the standard, not so happy reading of the 
Euthyphro’s ending: ‘just when he is ready to press further to help Euthyphro express his knowledge, if 
indeed he does possess it, Euthyphro begs off on the excuse of business elsewhere’ (Cooper 1997a, 1). 
The standard reading has never paid due attention to the possible range of interpretations here. As will 
hopefully become clearer in the course of this essay – although it will not be argued explicitly –, one 
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In the following I briefly describe a number of additional moments in the Socratic dialogues 
which are apt to further reveal Socrates’ striking concern with his individual interlocutors. 
a. As already mentioned, there is Socrates’ honest interest in the current topic of discus-
sion or whatever is occupying the minds of his respective interlocutors when they meet 
Socrates. Socrates does not force onto them whatever might be on his mind. He is not a 
dogmatist.
10
 
b. Socrates takes each of his interlocutors seriously as a person. He makes this explicit in 
the Gorgias, when he distinguishes his philosophy from oratorical practice, like that of 
Polus for instance (Socrates’ interlocutor in the relevant part of the Gorgias). While 
Polus, like in court, seeks to convert a large number of anonymous witnesses to testify 
to the truth or falsity of one claim or another, Socrates is exclusively concerned with his 
actual interlocutor and only them during their conversation. As Socrates points out to 
Polus: 
SOCRATES: . . . I’m only one person, I don’t agree with you. You don’t compel me; 
instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish 
me from my property, the truth. For my part, if I don’t produce you as a 
single witness to agree with what I’m saying, then I suppose I’ve 
achieved nothing worth mentioning concerning the things we’ve been 
discussing. And I suppose you haven’t either, if I don’t testify on your 
side, though I’m just one person, and you disregard all these other 
people. (Gorgias 472b–c) 
This further illustrates that Socrates is not a common sense philosopher. He does not 
base his proceedings on ‘what everyone believes’ and is not, at least not primarily, 
interested in that. Compare also the following passage: 
[SOCRATES:]  “Do the cowardly go forward to things which inspire confidence, 
and the courageous toward things to be feared?” 
[PROTAGORAS:] “So it is said by most people.” 
[SOCRATES:]  “Right, but I am not asking that. Rather, what do you say the 
courageous go boldly toward: toward things to be feared, believing 
them to be fearsome, or toward things not to be feared?” 
(Protagoras 359c–d) 
c. Socrates focuses exclusively on the statements, beliefs and commitments of his 
interlocutors, which is perhaps made most explicit by Socrates in the following ex-
change with Protagoras: 
[PROTAGORAS:] “It’s not so absolutely clear a case to me, Socrates, as to make me 
grant that justice is pious, and piety just. It seems a distinction is in 
                                                                                                                                                           
underlying problem of this standard account of Plato’s Socratic dialogues lies in commentators’ one-sided 
focus on philosophical knowledge (as opposed to philosophical understanding). 
10
 See for example Euthyphro 3d–4c; Crito 43c–d, 44c, 45a; Laches 181d; Lesser Hippias 363a–b. 
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order here. But what’s the difference? If you want, we’ll let justice 
be pious and piety just.” 
[SOCRATES:]  “Don’t do that to me! It’s not this ‘if you want’ or ‘if you agree’ 
business I want to test. It’s you and me I want to put on the line, 
and I think the argument will be tested best if we take the ‘if’ out.” 
(Protagoras 331c) 
In the same manner Socrates issues the following warning in the Crito: 
SOCRATES: . . . And Crito, see that you do not agree to this, contrary to your belief. 
For I know that only a few people hold this view or will hold it . . . . So 
then consider very carefully whether we have this view in common, and 
whether you agree, and let this be the basis of our deliberation. (Crito 
49d) 
However interested Socrates may be in discovering the truth, he clearly holds that it is 
of at least equally great importance that his interlocutor be honest and that he under-
stand what they are inclined to think and believe.
11
 
d. Socrates himself avoids expressing personal opinions or advancing controversial theses. 
He tends, rather, to appeal to accepted truisms when he is not directly asking a question. 
Note, however, that this is not to say that Socrates does not occasionally express his 
own opinions and beliefs. Nevertheless, it seems clear that it is his intention to avoid 
this as much as he can. But given that his dialogues partly (and inevitably) also serve as 
the examination of his own thinking, this should really not be too surprising.
12
 
e. Besides his notorious asking of question after question, it is noteworthy that Socrates 
constantly asks his interlocutors whether they can follow or whether they agree. 
Socrates is by no means a gnomic teacher. 
f. Socrates exhibits an extreme eagerness to give more detailed expression to his points or 
re-express one of his points whenever his interlocutors do not agree or have difficulties 
understanding him. Thus, Socrates is not only eager to ensure that he fully understands 
his interlocutors, but equally pays attention to their understanding of him so as to ensure 
that they understand each other. This gets illustrated in numerous passages in which 
                                                     
11
 Socrates himself, on the other hand, cannot be said to be honest in every case. There are too many 
cases in which he does not speak literally. The term ‘Socratic irony’ bears strong (and truthful) witness to 
this fact. These features of Socrates’ method will become clearer in the course of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of 
this essay. They largely follow from his role as philosophical mediator (‘midwife’). See also the next 
point in the main text, (d). 
12
 The (intended) appeal to truisms must not be confused with appeals to authority, especially not with 
appeals to authority by majority (‘what everyone believes’), à la Aristotle. Considering some of the 
aforementioned, it seems much more plausible that in these cases Socrates simply voices what he believes 
can be agreed upon between himself and his interlocutor. 
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Socrates elaborates on a point or question prompted by the expressed or perceived lack 
of understanding of his words on the part of his interlocutor.
13
 
g. Socrates himself also constantly asks for the meaning of what his interlocutors say in 
the course of a conversation. He does so in numerous instances.
14
 Remarkably, in the 
Laches Socrates actually instructs his interlocutors, Laches and Nicias, to do just this in 
their philosophical conversation, rather than to simply argue for the truth of their own 
opinions as they both prove to be more naturally inclined to.
15
 
h. Socrates, as is more widely acknowledged, seeks to uncover incoherent presumptions 
and related difficulties on the part of his conversational partners. I have already 
described one wonderful instance of this practice above with regard to the Euthyphro. 
Another classic example can be found in the elenctic beginnings of the Laches (190d 
ff.), which I discuss in some detail in Section 3 below. 
All of these practices illustrate a characteristic aspect of the Socratic method which does not 
usually receive much attention. Thus far, its importance has only been vaguely alluded to but it 
will become clearer as we proceed towards the more central questions of my essay. In the 
following section, I shall then attempt to show that certain more or less similar practices can be 
said to feature in later Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. In anticipation of an objection 
(old hat, really), which has enjoyed some considerable popularity with regard to certain 
accounts of both Socrates’ and Wittgenstein’s methods, some brief remarks might be in place 
before embarking on any comparative lines of my argument between Socrates and Wittgenstein. 
For example, it might be objected, with no particular reference to any comparison with 
Wittgenstein, that the way I have presented Socrates, i.e. leaving out the overarching 
epistemological and metaphysical concerns he is standardly assumed to have, makes him into 
some sort of linguistic idealist; but that, even if he wasn’t a strictly metaphysical Platonist, he 
was at least a sceptical one (as in early sceptical readings of Plato); at any rate, Socrates wasn’t 
interested in words or what we say but in the world; he wasn’t a linguist but a philosopher with 
a driving interest in metaphysical ontology.
16
 
                                                     
13
 See for example Charmides 167c–d, 170a–d, 173a, 174c–d; Laches 185b, 190d–191e, 191e–192c; 
Lysis 216c–d, 218d–e; Euthydemus 279d, 293d–e; Gorgias 447c–d, 461d–462a, 463e, 463e–465a, 466c–
d, 491d–e. 
14
 See for example Euthyphro 13a–d; Charmides 173d–174a; Laches 195a, 195c, 195d, 196a–d; Lysis 
208a, 212b; Protagoras 333d, 334a; Gorgias 450b–451a, 466a–b, 488b–d, 489d, 499d; Lesser Hippias 
364c–d, 369d; Ion 540b–c, 540e–541a. 
15
 See also (Vlastos 1994b, 8–9) and my discussion in Section 3 below. 
16
 See for example (Benson 2011, 194) for this kind of argument: ‘It is nearly certain that in pursuing 
his “What is piety?” question, for example, Socrates is not asking for the meaning of the word 
“piety” . . . . He is certainly not asking a question that could be answered by using a dictionary. He is 
asking the same sort of question that scientists ask when they ask “What is water?” and discover that the 
answer [sic] “Water is H2O”.’ 
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Now, the main problem with this kind of objection, it appears to me, is this: it is wrongly 
presupposed, as so often in the related kind of argument against so-called ‘linguistic 
philosophy’, that it is easily distinguishable whether in any given instance in our philosophical 
enquiry we are interested in the word or in the world. But, as Stanley Cavell has put it so 
beautifully: 
If you feel that finding out what something is must entail investigation of the world rather 
than of language, perhaps you are imagining a situation like finding out what somebody’s 
name and address are, or what the contents of a will or a bottle are, or whether frogs eat 
butterflies. But now imagine that you are in your armchair reading a book of 
reminiscences and come across the word “umiak.” You reach for your dictionary and 
look it up. Now what did you do? Find out what “umiak” means, or find out what an 
umiak is? But how could we have discovered something about the world by hunting in 
the dictionary? If this seems surprising, perhaps it is because we forget that we learn 
language and learn the world together, that they become elaborated and distorted together, 
and in the same places.’ (Cavell 1969b, 19) 
I therefore also find myself in agreement with Cavell when he notes that, ‘Euthyphro does not 
need to learn any new facts, yet he needs to learn something: you can say either that in the 
Euthyphro Socrates was finding out what “piety” means or finding out what piety is’ (Cavell 
1969b, 21). 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
(Perissinotto 2013), in an attempt to explain Wittgenstein’s ‘anti-Platonism’, commits the same 
mistake. The only difference is that he tries to turn the fabricated dichotomy of word and world against 
Socrates, riding on the cliché of Socrates the silly old essentialist. 
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2 Two aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy 
Contrary to a still common belief, Wittgenstein was no philosopher of language. Or, if he was, 
then he was equally a metaphysician. Like Socrates, he was not interested in either the word or 
the world, but rather in both.
17
 But what, if anything, can be said to have been the subject matter 
of his philosophising? Besides language, alternative candidates that one often finds in 
categorisations of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre are philosophical psychology (or philosophy of mind), 
which he became more and more interested in after 1938, and philosophy of mathematics, 
which he once wanted to be recorded as his primary area of research in an encyclopaedia entry, 
and also of course logic.
18
 However I believe that we should be suspicious of such categorisa-
tions in any substantial sense.
19
 For, arguably, in an important sense Wittgenstein’s interest in 
all of these areas of philosophical research has been essentially the same. 
I do not see any good reason to try to decide this matter definitively, once and for all. Clearly, 
having had a background in applied and pure mathematics and furthermore having made several 
contributions, however systematic or unsystematic, to the philosophical study of mathematics, 
Wittgenstein can be said to have been a philosopher of mathematics, amongst other things, or to 
have had a specific interest in the subject matter of mathematics from a philosophical point of 
view. On the other hand, perhaps with special regard to Wittgenstein’s methodological 
innovations, it constitutes an, at least, equally important aspect of his work that there appears to 
be some sort of unifying principle which makes whatever traditional subject matter his 
philosophising has look to be of merely secondary importance. It does seem to me important, 
though, not to let these two ways of looking at Wittgenstein’s philosophy come too far apart 
from each other in explicating it. Hence, in the present section I am going to, firstly, describe 
one aspect of Wittgenstein’s later methods that is significantly related to the concern about the 
philosophising individual that we have already noted to be a striking feature of the Socratic 
method in the preceding section. However, secondly, I am going to try to indicate how the 
practice of the resulting kind of philosophy – despite its focus on the philosophising individual – 
                                                     
17
 G. E. Moore’s note in ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33’ (1954) thus remains true of 
Wittgenstein also in later years: ‘[Wittgenstein] did discuss at very great length . . . certain very general 
questions about language; but he said, more than once, that he did not discuss these questions because he 
thought that language was the subject-matter of philosophy. He did not think that it was. He discussed it 
only because he thought that particular philosophical errors or “troubles in our thought” were due to false 
analogies suggested by our actual use of expressions; and he emphasized that it was only necessary for 
him to discuss those points about language which, as he thought, led to these particular errors or 
“troubles”’ (Moore 1954, 5–6). 
18
 Cf., for example, the table of contents in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein (Kuusela and 
McGinn 2011). 
19
 Felix Mühlhölzer makes a convincing case against such attempted substantial categorising in 
(Mühlhölzer forthcoming). 
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can still be genuinely concerned with the truth with respect to a particular subject matter or 
question.
20
 
Wittgenstein, by now perhaps notoriously, often compares his (later) methods of philosophy 
to a kind of therapy, especially on occasion to psychotherapy and more specifically to Freud’s 
psychoanalysis; e.g. in the following passage from The Big Typescript: 
[in philosophy] we can only convict somebody else of a mistake if he acknowledges that 
this really is the expression of his thinking. For only if he acknowledges it as such, is it 
the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.) What the other person acknowledges is the 
analogy I am proposing to him as the source of his thought. (BT 410)
21
 
In recent years there has been increasing controversy about the extent to which this analogy 
holds or can even be helpful.
22
 It is a remarkable fact that readers as different as Peter Hacker 
and the later Gordon Baker have both made use of this analogy, while their major disagreements 
also appear importantly related to the differences in their respective interpretations of it.
23
 I do 
not want to comment on what is in itself a very intricate relationship between the exegetical 
works of these two great minds. For my purposes it will be sufficient to note the perceived 
centrality of a notion of therapy (or several such notions) for the understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s (later) work. Insofar as Baker and Hacker’s joint early work, and to a similar 
extent Hacker’s ongoing work, neglects many of the positive, potentially helpful, aspects of an 
analogy with therapy, the later Baker, in criticising this neglect, might have developed a ten-
dency to overemphasise its potentially positive effects on reading (later) Wittgenstein, while not 
devoting much attention to the potentially less positive effects the analogy might have on 
readers of (later) Wittgenstein.
24
 
For example, as Anthony Kenny has also noted, emphasising the supposed therapeutic 
aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy can easily produce the appearance of some sort of anti-
philosophy,
25
 whose sole purpose is the negative one of ridding ourselves of misunderstandings 
that are engendered by some sort of linguistic misconceptions: ‘If philosophy is therapeutic . . . 
then must not the role of philosophy be a negative one? Philosophy, it seems, is only useful to 
people who are sick in some way; a healthy person . . . has no need of philosophy’ (Kenny 1982, 
                                                     
20
 This point will also be discussed, at somewhat greater length, in the next section (Section 3). 
21
 Cf. also (b) and (c) from the characteristics of the Socratic method listed above. 
22
 However, relevant secondary literature dates back as far as to (Waismann 1956) and (Wisdom 
1936). 
23
 See (Hacker 2007) for one presentation of their disagreements. See (Baker 1997, [152 ff.]) for a 
more or less systematic presentation of the way he believes the analogy should be understood. (Notably, 
in earlier papers, Baker used to be more cautious in using the analogy with therapy; see for example 
(Baker 1997, [146]).) 
24
 This becomes perhaps more or less understandable when seen from the historical perspective of that 
particular situation in place and time of Wittgenstein scholarship. 
25
 The most striking recent example of this tendency is Alain Badiou’s Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy 
(2011). 
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4–5). Kenny then goes on to point out that, even though philosophy’s role (under this concep-
tion) is indeed a wholly negative one, it is still relevant for human beings per se, insofar as it is 
part of our human condition that we speak natural languages which have the same traps for 
everyone who engages in any sort of abstract or theoretical thinking.
26
 Wittgenstein once 
expressed this idea in the following way: 
As long as there still is a verb ‘to be’ that looks as though it functions in the same way as 
‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, 
‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time & an expanse of space, etc., 
etc., people will keep stumbling over the same cryptic difficulties & staring at something 
that no explanation seems capable of clearing up. (CV 22e) 
And while Kenny does mention a positive aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – namely, the 
creation of ‘Übersichten’ (overviews, surveys) or ‘übersichtliche Darstellungen’ (perspicuous 
(re)presentations) – he goes on to subordinate this aim under the negative aim of dissolving 
difficulties.
27
 I do not quite agree with this. Whatever Wittgenstein’s own characterisation of 
(his) philosophy may have been at one point or another,
28
 I believe there is a clear and important 
case to be made for a genuinely positive effect of his philosophy. For example, besides certain 
methods and techniques (finding new analogies, drawing comparisons, inventing language-
games, etc.) of ‘grammatical enquiry’ as well as associated skills (creativity, imagination, etc.), 
the teaching of methods by way of examples (PI §133) will also help us – apart from peripheral 
factual knowledge that comes with it as a by-product – to better understand whatever the subject 
of our (exemplary) inquiries is, in ways that are truly philosophical insofar as they might be 
roughly circumscribed as ‘knowing our way about with these things’, viz. having successfully 
reversed the philosophically problematic state of ‘I don’t know my way about’ (PI §123). As a 
look at some of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts as well as his lectures reveals, apart from the form 
of teaching in Philosophical Investigations, the conception of philosophy taught in this manner 
also provided space for more exploratory work, e.g. the space of psychological concepts.
29
 It is 
helpful to see how in this regard Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy resembles that of 
Socrates. When we think about friendship, for instance, and perhaps at first get rather confused 
about what it could be, after some time we will hopefully—if we conduct our enquiries in the 
right way— know better what it is (even though we might be more inclined than ever to say that 
we don’t30): it is only after having conducted such philosophical reflection on the question 
                                                     
26
 See (Kenny 1982, 17–19). Kenny almost exclusively focuses on scientific endeavours, but I believe 
it should be quite clear that we can easily run into philosophical difficulties when thinking about human 
relationships of friendship or love, for instance (of which Socrates, of course, gives impressive evidence). 
27
 Cf. also (Strawson 1956) for the same kind of move. 
28
 See for example the famous PI §118. 
29
 The student notes in Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–1947 (PGL) give 
good evidence of this, as do the various Nachlass items documenting Wittgenstein’s intense work on 
questions concerning mathematics throughout the 1930s. 
How to Write Like Socrates Spoke? Wittgenstein & Plato on Mutual Understanding in Philosophy | 20 
‘What is love?’, say, that I will be able to give a halfway decent answer to my children when 
they ask me this question repeatedly. Arguably, the same holds for the question ‘What is a 
private language?’ (see my discussion in Section 4.1).31 
Anthony Kenny mentions one more aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, or rather his 
conception of it, which seems to me to be true regardless of the aforementioned disagreement I 
may have with Kenny and which is of great relevance to the argument of this essay. Kenny 
writes: ‘Philosophy is something which everybody must do for himself; . . . In the case of curing 
an individual sickness or in the case of mental discipline one cannot say that once done it need 
not be done again. It must be done for each person afresh’ (Kenny 1982, 25). Unfortunately, 
Kenny does not give any indication of why he thinks this is. Rather, he seems to understand this 
as being a matter of course. However, I think that Kenny’s thought must be different from the 
one that I want to bring into view here, since he then goes on to say the following: ‘This insight 
of Wittgenstein’s seems to me correct; but I do not think it means in any way that his thought is 
as discontinuous with the great tradition of Western philosophy as he sometimes seems to have 
believed it was’ (Kenny 1982, 25). In the following sections of the present essay, I shall try to 
present my case for one significant difference between most of the great tradition of Western 
philosophy and what I take to be an essential feature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that 
follows from exactly the insight Kenny mentions so very casually, which may also be called the 
individuality of philosophical understanding.
32
 
Wittgenstein’s declared aim (or at least one of them) was to ‘show the fly the way out of the 
fly-bottle’ (PI §309). But achieving this entails that the fly actually understands what we are 
                                                                                                                                                           
30
 Cf. the end of the Lysis: ‘[SOCRATES:] “Now we’ve done it, Lysis and Menexenus—made fools of 
ourselves, I, an old man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that we are friends of 
one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out”’ 
(Lysis 223b). 
31
 Again, in this respect, the same is true of Wittgenstein’s methods as of Socrates’. As Gregory 
Vlastos says about perhaps the most central of Socrates’ techniques: ‘elenchus has a double objective: to 
discover how every human being ought to live and to test that single human being who is doing the 
answering — to find out if he is living as one ought to live. This is a two-in-one operation. Socrates does 
not provide for two types of elenchus – a philosophical one, searching for truth about the good life, and a 
therapeutic one, searching out the answerer’s own in the hope of bringing him to the truth. There is one 
elenchus and it must do both jobs, though one or the other will be to the fore in different phases of it’ 
(Vlastos 1994b, 10). 
32
 Dale Jacquette has recently argued against the consistence of this last mentioned aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s methodology, hence rejecting the ‘psychological’ component and embracing the ‘semantic’ 
component instead, viz. that the real problems for Wittgenstein lay in our common language (‘language 
itself’) rather than the ‘language-using subject’ (see (Jacquette 2014, 264 ff.)). However, as I shall argue 
in the following, it is in fact essential not to let these two vital components come apart (as in Jacquette’s 
account) in order to see the positive effects of this method that it has in both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
matters, viz. how Wittgenstein’s (later) philosophy, pace Jacquette, is not some kind of ‘anti-philosophy’. 
Cf., for example, the following reflection of Wittgenstein’s in this connection: ‘What is it that is repulsive 
in the idea that we study the use of a word, point to mistakes in the description of this use and so on? First 
and foremost one asks oneself: How could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what one 
calls a “wrong description” is a description that does not accord with established usage – or one which 
does not accord with the practice of the person giving the description. Only in the second case does a 
philosophical conflict arise’ (RPP I §548). 
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trying to show it. Yet some flies aren’t exactly smart and most others can be expected to be at 
least as hard a case as the recalcitrant student in PI §185. And what is a helpful hint for one fly 
might only create more confusion for another. I think that something similar is true of homo 
philosophandus. As Wittgenstein writes, ‘Any explanation can be misunderstood’ (PI §28). And 
I believe this holds true of philosophical matters in particular. The following story about 
Wittgenstein, as retold by Warren Goldfarb, might be apt to illustrate this: 
Imagine a child, learning that the earth is round, asking why then people in Australia 
don’t fall off. I suppose one natural response would be to start to explain about gravity. 
Wittgenstein, instead, [presumably being somewhere in Europe] would draw a circle with 
a stick figure atop it, turn it upside down, and say “Now we fall into space.” (Goldfarb 
1992, 111) 
Wittgenstein addresses the child’s question not as a mere call for information that the child was 
lacking, but as unclarity on the part of the child about certain pieces of information which they 
already possess. Thus, as was the case with Socrates and Euthyphro, Wittgenstein does not tell 
the child anything they did not know before but helps the child to a better understanding of (the 
implications of) what they already know, trying to offer a representation that will be 
perspicuous to the child. Goldfarb puts it thus: 
[Wittgenstein] is examining the source of the child’s question, in the concepts with which 
the child is operating. Given those concepts, an appeal to gravity can do nothing but 
mislead: the child will take it that the antipodal people are upside down, but they have 
gravity shoes, or glue, or something similar, that keeps them attached to the surface of the 
earth; as for us, we are right side up, so the problem does not arise. What Wittgenstein’s 
trick does is precisely to expose the conceptual confusion in the way the child is thinking 
of up and down. (Goldfarb 1992, 111) 
While being interested primarily in explaining the difference between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical explanation and a standard scientific explanation, Goldfarb does not mention that, 
in principle, there is no reason why the child should not also misunderstand Wittgenstein’s trick. 
The story, as it is told, seems to imply that the child did indeed actually stop asking the question 
because Wittgenstein successfully illustrated how their question was confused. However, it 
seems to me that this could only mean that Wittgenstein fortuitously (or perhaps in virtue of his 
wise experience) hit the right button and thus ‘exposed the conceptual confusion’, as Goldfarb 
has it, only somewhat luckily. For example, in a manner not too dissimilar from the recalcitrant 
student of PI §185 (while of course still much less of a lost case), the child could have pointed 
to the upper figure in the inverted drawing and replied, ‘well, no; we don’t fall into space now, 
because we’re up there, stupid!’ 
Therefore, as a closer look at this little story brings out: one and the same expression – here 
in the form of the question ‘Why don’t people in Australia fall off the earth?’ – can be the result 
of any number of misunderstandings. When dealing with this type of problem, as Wittgenstein 
remarked, we will only be able to make progress if ‘the other person acknowledges . . . the 
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analogy I am proposing to him as the source of his thought’ (BT 410). This is why for 
Wittgenstein, as for Socrates, it is so important to pay close attention to one’s interlocutor, their 
words, their reactions and their responses. If one particular attempt to find the right analogy fails, 
this need not therefore be seen to pose a serious problem for our respective philosophical 
method. Like any of us, presumably, Wittgenstein would have had a number of alternative 
responses at his disposal. Of course, for example, he could have tried to bring out the point of 
the reversed picture by addressing the child with a series of questions, like Socrates would have 
done. 
 
A random example 
It will be useful at this stage to discuss at some length several related features of some of 
Wittgenstein’s famous remarks on meaning and use in Philosophical Investigations. I want to 
remark on a difficulty which can hardly be remarked upon often enough. The difficulty con-
cerns what Wittgenstein writes in Section 43 of Philosophical Investigations, namely that ‘. . . 
the meaning of a word is its use in the language . . .’ (PI §43), as it is often quoted. It may serve 
as a useful first approximation to the problem to note what O. K. Bouwsma noted as early as 
1961, as it appears to have lost none of its relevance: 
The meaning of a word is its use. . . . Nearly everyone these days speaks and writes in this 
new fashion. And yet nothing has been changed. If before we were puzzled with: What is 
the meaning of a word? now we are puzzled with: What is the use of a word? (Bouwsma 
1961, 158–9)33 
The difficulty is not merely taking Wittgenstein to not be expounding a fully-fledged use-theory 
of meaning. For instance, with particular respect to Wittgenstein’s declared abstinence from 
(controversial) theses in philosophy, it appears equally problematic to think that for 
Wittgenstein the idea of meaning as use had any global importance or methodologically 
superior status in his philosophical practice.
34
 
Besides the countless ways in which this passage can be misunderstood (and has been), Alois 
Pichler (2004) points out that it would be particularly mistaken to comment on the preceding 
Sections 40–42 as though they represented anything like an argument by Wittgenstein to the 
conclusion that meaning somehow, if only for ‘a large class of cases’ (PI §43), must be use.35 In 
his exposition, Pichler lays particular stress on the polyphonic structure of Wittgenstein’s 
                                                     
33
 Cf. also James Conant for whom it was still appropriate in 1998 to make the following cynical 
remark: ‘Wittgenstein has become famous in recent years for putting forward something that gets called a 
“use-theory of meaning”’ (Conant 1998, 238). Notably, even Anthony Kenny ran into these problems (see 
(Kenny 2006, chap. 9)). 
34
 See for example (Giesewetter 2014). 
35
 For instance Peter Hacker, in his revised commentary, shows a tendency to present the sections in 
such a way; see (Hacker 2005, 117 ff.). 
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Philosophical Investigations.
36
 Hence, for example, according to Pichler’s dialogical (or 
plurilogical) reading, it is not Wittgenstein who speaks in Section 40. Rather, it is the voice of a 
fictional character with a tendency towards some sort of ‘linguistic dogmatism’ who begins in 
Section 40; Pichler calls this character ‘Hans’. Hans thinks that he could easily refute a second 
character, whom Pichler chooses to call ‘Franz’ (note the wide scope of possible individual 
identification that is expressed in Pichler’s choice of this proverbial conjunction of German 
names – ‘jeder Hans und Franz’; also note that, given what we know about the composition 
process of the text of the Investigations, these voices are likely to have evolved from past alter 
egos of Wittgenstein himself or from conversations with friends, colleagues or students). Pichler 
assigns one further voice, that of the ‘Moderator’, which according to Pichler comes closest to 
what Wittgenstein himself would be likely to say in certain exchanges but should nevertheless 
not be identified with him.
37
 Franz is inclined to hold that the meaning of a word is ‘the object 
for which the word stands’ (PI §1)). Hans believes himself to be able to prove Franz wrong by 
means of a reductio ad absurdum argument. 
Thus, in Section 40 Wittgenstein has Hans say the following: 
[Hans]: It is important to note that it is a solecism to use the word “meaning” to signify 
the thing that ‘corresponds’ to a word. That is to confound the meaning of a 
name with the bearer of the name. When Mr N.N. dies, one says that the bearer 
of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say 
this, for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say “Mr 
N.N. is dead”. (PI §40) 
So Hans argues that Franz’s reliance on the picture that the meaning of a word is the object for 
which the word stands leads to a paradox because it mixes up the meaning of a word with its 
bearer. It can be seen from the fact that Wittgenstein would have been well aware that this 
argument is not going to be (or, at any rate: need not be) the last word between Hans and Franz 
that it would be exegetically inaccurate to think that this argument was straightforwardly 
asserted by Wittgenstein in this passage. It is indeed easy to think of a way in which someone 
might want to escape Hans’ alleged reductio ad absurdum, and, given everything that has been 
said about later Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice in this essay up to this point, Wittgenstein 
can be reasonably expected to take such possibilities into account. Pichler agrees: ‘The problem 
is not so much a theoretical one. It is not the case that one promoting an “object theoretical” 
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 Cf. also: ‘Wittgenstein’s individual remarks are fully intelligible only when understood as 
components of a dialogue, an interaction with a person to be understood as endowed with preferences, 
prejudices, pictures, cravings, anxieties, etc. Hence what is to be counted as descriptions of the grammar 
of his language is a matter for specific investigation, negotiation and acknowledgement. This cannot in 
principle be ascertained independently of a discussion of each specific issue with him’ (Baker 1997, 
[164]). 
37
 This set-up is thus, in principle, very similar to the one in Plato’s Laches, for large parts of which 
Socrates instructs and moderates a philosophical dialogue between Nicias and Laches. Compare my 
discussion of this dialogue in the following Section 3 (see also Section 4, however, concerning significant 
differences between Plato’s dialogues and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations). 
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account of meaning would simply contradict themselves when confronted with sentences like 
“Mr N.N. is dead”’ (Pichler 2004, 172, my translation). And Pichler adds: ‘After all, as the 
Tractatus masterfully demonstrates, the only thing he needs to do is to put the level of objects 
further back and the “meaning” will be rescued’ (Pichler 2004, 172, my translation).38 
Now, when we are further reminded in PI §42 that we sometimes say that a word has a 
meaning even if by definition there is no object that it stands for (we might react to such a word 
‘with a shake of the head’), it can easily appear as though Wittgenstein suggested inferring from 
this that meaning therefore must be use, as he then goes on to ‘conclude’ in the following 
Section 43. — But this would be mistaken. 
The final sentence of Section 43 gives us a useful hint. After having written that for ‘a large 
class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” – though not for all – this word can be 
explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (PI §43), Wittgenstein 
adds: ‘And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer’ (PI §43); as 
when I’m being asked, ‘what does the word “bottle” mean?’, and I simply hold one up.39 This 
final sentence is intended by Wittgenstein to make sure that no one thinks he would want to 
deny such an obvious fact. Next consider that we did not take such care to distinguish the 
various voices from Wittgenstein’s own, especially that of Hans which is definitely the most 
likely to be confused with Wittgenstein’s;40 viz. if we took Wittgenstein to be arguing towards 
some sort of conclusion in Section 43, would this last sentence (‘the meaning of a name is 
sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer’ (PI §43)) not contradict what, on such an 
understanding, Wittgenstein would be held to have claimed before in Section 40, namely that ‘it 
is a solecism to use the word “meaning” to signify the thing that ‘corresponds’ to a word’ (PI 
§40)? 
We now see how what is going on in Section 43 and the surrounding sections is not too 
different from the story about the child and the earth. In neither of these cases is Wittgenstein 
attempting to persuade us by means of argumentation. I have already indicated one reason why I 
think this is, namely what I proposed calling the ‘individuality of philosophical understanding’. 
And perhaps, at this point in the discussion, it will be acceptable to extrapolate from 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of ostensive explanation as follows. For it seems to me that we are 
dealing with essentially the same difficulty here that he introduces in the early sections of the 
book. In PI §29, we read: 
                                                     
38
 Hacker makes the same point: ‘Those sublimated names and the correlative metaphysics [of the 
Tractatus] were expressly designed to ensure that every genuine name on analysis stands for an object 
that cannot cease to exist’ (Hacker 2005, 117). 
39
 Of course, ‘bottle’ is not a name, but my example is based upon the logical confusion of names with 
meaningful words that the relevant passages in the PI are playing with. 
40
 One typical example of this confusion of Hans and Wittgenstein, which can be found in a majority 
of interpretative accounts, concerns §246. See my discussion in Section 4.1, below. 
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Perhaps someone will say, “two” can be ostensively defined only in this way: “This 
number is called ‘two’.” For the word “number” here shows what place in language, in 
grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word “number” must be 
explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. (PI §29) 
The sort of response which follows, I believe, holds (at least) as true of any philosophical 
explanation as of the ‘ostensive definition of “two”’: 
Whether the word “number” is necessary in an ostensive definition of “two” depends on 
whether without this word the other person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. 
And that will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I 
give it to.’ (PI §29) 
Wittgenstein’s awareness of such variance in the understanding of different individuals with 
regard to Section 43—i.e. his awareness of the two sides of the coin that is the difficulty of 
dispelling one kind of misunderstanding without engendering a new one—gets even more 
evident when we take a look at a related section such as Section 138:
41
 
But can’t the meaning of a word that I understand fit the sense of a sentence that I 
understand? Or the meaning of one word fit the meaning of another? —– Of course, if the 
meaning is the use we make of the word, it makes no sense to speak of such fitting. But 
we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp the meaning at a 
stroke, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the ‘use’ which 
is extended in time! (PI §138) 
This particular misunderstanding of what Wittgenstein is trying to teach us about meaning and 
use—a lesson of which Section 43 is generally assumed to form a salient part—leads up to the 
entire discussion of rules and rule-following, which extends over the subsequent series of more 
than a hundred sections starting from Section 139, and which (hopefully) corrects any such 
misunderstandings.
42
 
Hence, as all these considerations are supposed to demonstrate, it would be a mistake to 
think that Wittgenstein in PI §43 intended to present us with anything like the golden truth 
                                                     
41
 Brian McGuinness has also summarised matters aptly: ‘So Wittgenstein wants to avoid the 
mythologies implicit in our first reflections on language. He wants to substitute a form of reflection that 
avoids it – though perhaps at the risk of introducing a new mythology of its own, that of ‘use’ as 
something present all at once, for example’ (McGuinness 1982, 42–43). 
See also my discussion of Wittgenstein’s chess analogy in Section 4, below. 
42
 Other related sections from Philosophical Investigations include §117, and also §1 where ‘meaning’ 
and ‘use’ actually get contrasted in the following way: ‘– But what is the meaning of the word “five”? – 
No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used’ (PI §1). 
The secondary literature is of course full of possible misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s point about 
meaning and use. Another interesting possible misunderstanding, however, may be this: if instead of ‘the 
meaning of words’ we speak of ‘the use of words’ does this not make it look as though there were some 
kind of problem concerning any given instance of ‘language use’ to which we apply this locution? For, if 
one ‘uses’ a word, sentence or expression, does this not indicate some form of alienation, or: does this not 
entail that our relation to language is not natural, that our speaking does not simply flow but is somehow 
defective and requires special caution (as though we first had to calculate the rules of the signs we intend 
to use)? (Thanks to Hannes Nykänen, in conversation with whom this possibility first occurred to me.) 
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about meaning, or indeed even with a claim concerning meaning and use.
43
 Analogously, the 
preceding three sections should not be read as an argument by him that leads up to it. Instead, as 
I have also tried to argue, we should read these sections as a dialogue between certain characters, 
none of which can be singly and directly identified with the author of the book.
44
 
But what is left then of Wittgenstein’s pointing out something about meaning and use? If he 
is not constructing theories, not asserting arguments, nor even making a claim, what then is he 
doing with ‘meaning’ and ‘use’? — O. K. Bouwsma has expressed this point with admirable 
sharpness, touching upon several of the themes discussed in the course of this section: 
It is intended . . . as an analogy . . . . it comes to something like this: If you will say ‘use’ 
and write ‘use’ instead of ‘meaning’ in writing and speaking of words, and can manage to 
think accordingly, that will help. Help what? It will help you to rid yourself of the 
temptation to think of the meaning as something in the dark which you cannot see very 
well. The idea is that if your thinking is dominated in this case by one misleading analogy 
then you may be led right by another leading analogy. If, of course, that second analogy 
also misleads one, not much may be gained. . . . So we may understand that sentence as 
one which is intended to help us to a change in perspective. Once that change has come 
about, the sentence . . . is of no further use. (Bouwsma 1961, 159) 
I believe more needs to be said, however. For, to some, this might sound all too negative again. 
One might also wonder, for example: if there are no doctrines to be learnt, are there only things 
to be unlearnt? – And, importantly, here the answer should be: No. But, just like with any 
Socratic dialogue, there is no one single determinate point to take home either. There are, 
amongst others, the following things to be learnt: a certain feeling (or taste?) for philosophical 
problems, a way of dealing with them, methods, techniques,
45
 a way of dealing with people, a 
way of understanding them, a way of understanding ourselves, and finally a way of seeing the 
world, a way of life.
46
 — And we will surely not fail to learn more about language and whatever 
our favourite subjects are either. In the end, all these go together, hand in hand, word and world. 
Or, as Cavell puts it: ‘For what Wittgenstein means when he says that philosophy really is 
descriptive is that it is descriptive of “our grammar,” of “the criteria we have” in understanding 
one another, knowing the world, and possessing ourselves’ (Cavell 1969b, [56]).  
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 See also my discussion of ‘golden’ or ‘literal’ truths in Section 4, below. 
44
 Here a comparison with Plato may seem to suggest itself. But more interestingly, there is actually a 
parallel to Socrates. As pointed out under (c) and (d) of the foregoing section, Socrates often acts as a 
mediator (or moderator) which is why he does not always speak in his own voice, as it were. Thus, 
contrary to what many commentators have thought, the fact that Socrates says apparently contradictory 
things about ‘courage’, in the Laches (194c–d) on the one hand and in the Protagoras (360b–e) on the 
other, need not indicate any change of mind on his side. 
45
 These ‘methods and techniques’ can now also be seen to comprise the equivalents of the Socratic 
ones listed in Section 1, in particular those listed under (b)–(g). 
46
 Note how, except perhaps for the last two items here (a way of seeing the world, a way of life), 
Socrates can be said in the Euthyphro to have brought it about that all of the others dawned on his 
interlocutor in some form or other. 
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3 Plato on mutual understanding 
In Section 1, I pointed out Socrates’ philosophical concern for his various interlocutors as 
persons, including both their intellectual and practical lives, and certain connected features of 
his philosophical method. In Section 2, I introduced some basic features of (later) 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and discussed, in particular, the role of the individual 
in dealing with philosophical problems and in achieving philosophical understanding. In the 
present section, I shall try to elaborate further on questions concerning the practice and, espe-
cially, the teaching of the kind of philosophy that both Wittgenstein and Socrates appear to have 
advocated. 
In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates discourses with his friend Phaedrus on the qualities of three 
kinds of communication: oratory/speech-giving, personal dialogue/conversation (dialectic) and 
writing. Before coming to the interpretation of those parts of this discourse that are most rele-
vant for the questions of the present essay, it should be noted that Socrates is concerned 
especially with a philosophical kind of understanding in the Phaedrus. He introduces this focus 
to Phaedrus, for example, in the following way: 
SOCRATES: Now isn’t this much absolutely clear: We are in accord with one another 
about some of the things we discourse about and in discord about others? 
PHAEDRUS: I think I understand what you are saying; but, please, can you make it a 
little clearer? 
SOCRATES: When someone utters the word ‘iron’ or ‘silver,’ don’t we all think of the 
same thing? 
PHAEDRUS: Certainly. 
SOCRATES: But what happens when we say ‘just’ or ‘good’? Doesn’t each one of us go 
in a different direction? Don’t we differ with one another and even with 
ourselves? (Phaedrus 263a)
47 48
 
                                                     
47
 It is remarkable that although the Phaedrus is not counted among the Socratic dialogues, neither in 
methodological nor in chronological classifications, the character of Socrates does exhibit in this passage 
several of the methodological features that I described in Section 1 above. (Perhaps this is because this 
dialogue is intended in many ways to demonstrate Socrates’ superior, oral practice of philosophy.) Firstly, 
we note that Socrates is exclusively asking questions of Phaedrus ((e)). Secondly, Socrates is not saying 
anything controversial, but rather proceeds with what appear to be commonplaces ((f)). Next, it is 
remarkable that Socrates waits for Phaedrus to answer – after all, what has been said is really so obvious, 
isn’t it? – and that, following Phaedrus’ asking for clarification of what it is that Socrates meant, Socrates 
is happy to illustrate his point by giving an example, thus re-expressing his point in a way he hopes will 
help his interlocutor to understand him better ((h)). Socrates’ second attempt is phrased as a question 
again, or rather as a series of questions. For not only does he try to put his point in different terms, he also 
decides to divide his presentation into smaller steps. Hence, he first illustrates one side of the distinction 
he wishes Phaedrus to acknowledge. He awaits the latter’s response, and only then does he move on to 
illustrate the other side of the distinction. And reading further, we see that after having Phaedrus express 
his understanding and agreement with both these points, Socrates reintroduces the general point, and asks 
whether they now agree about it (‘PHAEDRUS: We certainly do. / SOCRATES: Therefore, we agree about 
the former and disagree about the latter. / PHAEDRUS: Right. / SOCRATES: Now . . .’ (263a–b)). 
48
 It may be obvious from reading the dialogue, quite independently of this particular passage, that 
Socrates’ interest is primarily in understanding of the philosophical kind. Cf. also the following two 
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Like Wittgenstein, Plato compares ‘the art of the true rhetorician’, i.e. philosophy, with that of 
the medical doctor: 
SOCRATES: Well, isn’t the method of medicine in a way the same as the method of 
rhetoric? 
PHAEDRUS: How so? 
SOCRATES: In both cases we need to determine the nature of something—of the body 
in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we’ll have will be an 
empirical and artless practice. We won’t be able to supply, on the basis of 
an art, a body with the medicines and diet that will make it healthy and 
strong, or a soul with the reasons and customary rules for conduct that will 
impart to it the convictions and virtues we want. (Phaedrus 270b)
49
 
A medical doctor’s efforts are usually directed at other people’s health. Like philosophers, Plato 
implies, they get trained to understand others, which is a necessary element of both arts. The 
analogy with a kind of therapy, in its most general sense, emphasises the role of the individual 
in philosophical understanding. However, note that neither in Plato nor in Wittgenstein need this 
mean that all philosophical work is the mere exorcism of one sort of misunderstanding or 
another. 
Then, again discussing the art of rhetoric while really expounding the ideal of philosophical 
conversation (dialectic
50
), Plato has Socrates and Phaedrus agree on the following: 
SOCRATES: Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be 
a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul there are. Their number is 
so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such a sort; hence some people have 
such-and-such a character and others have such-and-such. Those distinctions 
established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many kinds of speech, each of such-
and-such a sort. People of such-and-such a character are easy to persuade by 
speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with such-and-such an issue 
for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are 
difficult to persuade for those particular reasons. 
 The orator must learn all this well, then put his theory into practice and 
develop the ability to discern each kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of 
real life. (Phaedrus 271d–e; see also 277b–c) 
This passage is likely to strike one as expressing a rather peculiar way of thinking about an 
entity such as the soul, as though souls were as easily categorised as different kinds of dog. But, 
focusing on what is effectively being said in this passage, it seems we would do well to distin-
guish what is being said from how it is being said (insofar as this is possible, anyway). The 
                                                                                                                                                           
passages. Announcing the final (dialectical) third of the dialogue, Socrates exclaims: ‘Come to us, then, 
noble creatures; convince Phaedrus . . . that unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able 
to make a proper speech on any subject’ (261a). Towards the end of the dialogue Socrates suggests 
calling those who have mastered his ideal of the art of conversation ‘philosophers’: ‘PHAEDRUS: What 
name, then, would you give such a man? / SOCRATES: To call him wise, Phaedrus, seems to me too much, 
and proper only for a god. To call him wisdom’s lover—a philosopher—or something similar would fit 
him better and be more seemly’ (278d). 
49
 See also 268a–269d. 
50
 ‘God knows whether this is the right name for those who can do this correctly or not, but so far I 
have always called them “dialecticians”’ (266b–c). 
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schematic character of Socrates’ presentation of the importance and difficulty of knowing one’s 
interlocutor’s (type of) soul may only be due to Socrates’ awareness of his interlocutor’s, i.e. 
Phaedrus’ characteristic ways of understanding.51 
It seems to me that in the Phaedrus, we find Plato theorising about just what I presented in 
Section 1 of this essay as a much-neglected aspect of the Socratic method. All of the 
characteristics of Socrates’ philosophical dialogues listed in Section 1 can now be seen to flow 
from the same conviction expressed in the Phaedrus; namely the conviction that, in order to 
teach any philosophical insight to anyone, let alone philosophy as an art (as a method), it is 
essential to know whom you are teaching it to, to know your interlocutor’s background 
knowledge, as well as their temptations and desires (or, in other words: their soul). This is what 
I earlier proposed to call the ‘individuality of philosophical understanding’, which as we saw in 
the previous section plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. 
Considering the inclusive presentation of oratory and dialectic (philosophy) in the Phaedrus, 
the question may reasonably occur of why this is in any way unique to philosophy and not, 
rather, true of almost any act of communication. In other words, it could be objected that 
Socrates would actually say the same thing about any spoken discourse, that it is no special 
characteristic of philosophy that one must know one’s interlocutor’s soul, and that I am reading 
something into the text that isn’t really there. — But let us consider the following. I said that 
Socrates chooses to introduce his focus on understanding of the philosophical kind by pointing 
to those notions about whose nature we are most likely to disagree, ‘with one another and even 
with ourselves’. Why is that? I think that Socrates chooses to do so because for him, this is the 
touchstone of a philosophical subject: insofar as the philosopher in us wants to know more or 
better in cases where we would normally take ourselves to know enough already (at least 
tacitly), it is fundamental for any serious philosophical dialogue that there be (or that room be 
made for) disagreement between the dialogue partners (even though this ‘disagreement’ might 
(and, in a way: should) at any moment turn out to be a disagreement about the meaning of the 
words that are used by the dialogue partners and indeed typically does turn out to be just that, 
viz. a misunderstanding of what one of the dialogue partners was trying to say, either by the 
other or by themselves)
52
. This is different from science, say, where our interest is driven by 
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 That Socrates merely presents a model in these words which need not correspond to reality in all its 
respects is also made clear by his acknowledgement that no human could achieve this ‘complete’ 
knowledge (‘Yet surely whatever one must go through on the way to an honorable goal is itself honorable’ 
(274a); cf. 274a–b and 278d). 
52
 Some might argue that philosophical disagreement is always only disagreement concerning the 
meaning of words. However, it seems rather obvious to me that sometimes a relevant disagreement does 
actually turn on a disagreement about certain states of affairs, for example concerning people’s intuitions 
(as is much debated in and around experimental philosophy nowadays). Again, in such a case, it might of 
course be said that this only showed the ‘disagreement’ not to be a ‘philosophical’ one. But I do not 
believe that our concept of philosophy entails such a distinction, nor that it is particularly useful to 
introduce one. 
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ignorance (the opposite of ‘knowledge’) rather than disagreement or misunderstanding (the 
opposite of ‘understanding’). Philosophical matters are those where opinions commonly lie 
further from each other than in any other kind of human endeavour. Is there any philosophical 
question where both the position that the thing in question exists and the position that it does not 
exist haven’t been defended in all seriousness? From a historical perspective, philosophical 
questions can be said to be the ones with regard to which ‘experts’ have tended to disagree for 
decades, sometimes hundreds or even thousands of years. Almost no philosophical question can 
be said to have been answered once and for all (unless we stipulate an extremely narrow notion 
of ‘philosophical question’). The point to be made, therefore, with respect to the relative signifi-
cance of knowing one’s interlocutor in philosophy, as compared to just any act of communica-
tion, is that no other kind of discourse has more potential for disagreement and hence 
misunderstanding between its respective participants – which is why it is in philosophy that it is 
most important to know one’s interlocutor’s soul well and hence to seek, and pay attention to, 
understanding each other. 
It has often been said that in Plato’s Socratic dialogues we do not find Socrates reflecting on 
his own methods.
53
 And with respect to what has come to be thought of, standardly, as the 
Socratic method, viz. the elenchus, this is certainly true. Socrates does indeed never use the 
word ‘elenchus’, nor does he describe this technique anywhere.54 The Laches, however, intro-
duces many of those fundamental aspects of the Socratic art of philosophising which I have 
described in this essay. In this dialogue, Socrates is shown discussing ‘courage (andreia)’ with 
the two accomplished generals Nicias and Laches, who have been asked to teach this virtue to 
the sons of two of their friends.
55
 The two generals soon find that they do not seem to have quite 
such a clear understanding of what courage is as, both being experienced military men, they had 
assumed they did.
56
 And it forms a unique moment in Plato’s Socratic dialogues when Socrates 
attempts to begin his examination and Laches does not understand what it is that Socrates is 
asking from him when posing his infamous ‘What is the F?’ question. At first Laches intuitively 
presents Socrates with a paradigmatic example of courage, rather than an answer in the form of 
a general definition. And surely, this is what many of us would do most naturally, and there is 
absolutely nothing wrong with that in principle. Socrates then spends considerable time explain-
ing to Laches what form the latter’s answer should take and how Socrates intends his question.57 
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 See for example (Vlastos 1994b, 1). 
54
 As I argued in Section 1, the elenchus is better understood as merely one prominent technique of his. 
55
 Cf. (a) from the list in Section 1, above. 
56
 Compare for instance Laches’ self-assuredness in the following part of the introductory exchange: 
‘SOCRATES: We say then, Laches, that we know what [virtue] is. / LACHES: Yes, we do say so. / 
SOCRATES: And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state? / LACHES: Of course’ (190c); also: 
‘LACHES: . . . I still think I know what courage is, but I can’t understand how it has escaped me just now 
so that I can’t pin it down in words and say what it is’ (194b). 
57
 Cf. (f) from the list in Section 1. 
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It is remarkable how, from this point in the dialogue onwards, Socrates, now knowing about 
Laches’ unfamiliarity with this kind of philosophical discourse, continues to instruct him and 
Nicias in how to conduct a philosophical conversation with one another. In the great majority of 
cases of his instruction, Socrates urges Nicias and Laches to try to understand what the other is 
attempting to say, rather than – as has been much more common in philosophical discourse until 
today – simply dismissing the other’s words as nonsense or arguing against a distorted version 
of the other’s expressed view.58 Take as an example the following passage in which Nicias 
offers his definition of courage: 
SOCRATES: Let him state what kind of knowledge it is. 
NICIAS:  What I say, Laches, is that it is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful 
in war and in every other situation. 
LACHES: How strangely he talks, Socrates. 
SOCRATES: What do you have in mind when you say this, Laches? 
LACHES:  What do I have in mind? Why, I take wisdom to be quite a different thing 
from courage. 
SOCRATES: Well, Nicias, at any rate, says it isn’t. 
LACHES: He certainly does—that’s the nonsense he talks. 
SOCRATES: Well, let’s instruct him instead of making fun of him. (Laches 194e–195a) 
By ‘instruct’ Socrates here clearly means, not ‘teaching what courage really is’, but rather 
‘helping someone express themselves more clearly, in a way that will be more readily 
intelligible to us, by putting in front of them the problems we have in understanding what they 
say’. – Compare also, for a second example, the first exchange between Laches and Nicias: 
LACHES:  It isn’t clear to me from this, Socrates, what he is trying to say. Because he 
doesn’t select either the seer or the doctor or anyone else as the man he calls 
courageous, unless some god is the person he means. Nicias appears to me 
unwilling to make a gentlemanly admission that he is talking nonsense, but 
he twists this way and that in an attempt to cover up his difficulty. Even you 
and I could have executed a similar twist just now if we had wanted to avoid 
the appearance of contradicting ourselves. If we were making speeches in a 
court of law, there might be some point in doing this, but as things are, why 
should anyone adorn himself senselessly with empty words in a gathering 
like this? 
SOCRATES: I see no reason why he should, Laches. But let us see if Nicias thinks he is 
saying something and is not just talking for the sake of talking. Let us find 
out from him more clearly what it is he means, and if he is really saying 
something, we will agree with him, but if not, we will instruct him.
59
 (Laches 
196a–c) 
Equally there are a significant number of passages in which, although Socrates is not explicitly 
giving advice, one of the three men who are participating in the conversation expresses unclarity 
about what has been said by another or directly asks for the meaning of their interlocutor’s 
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 Cf. esp. (c) and (g) from the list in Section 1. 
59
 Here ‘instruct’ should be read as ‘help him understand better’ (and here ‘understand’ should be read 
as comprising both possibilities: that Nicias be helped to understand courage (or some other thing) better 
or that he be helped to understand himself (or someone else) better, depending on whatever kind of 
understanding turns out to be most relevant). 
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words. In fact, most of the dialogue is framed as a quest for understanding what the other is 
trying to say that courage is.
60
 First Laches (190d–194b), and then Nicias (194c–199e) attempt 
to say what they respectively think it is. And – as we saw was the case with the Euthyphro 
(Section 1) – it would be careless to say that the Laches ended, ‘as usual’, in aporia. For, more 
importantly, the dialogue ends at a point where Nicias finally feels understood by Laches and 
Socrates (see esp. 198b–199a).61 
Hence, that which Plato has Socrates say in the above-quoted passage from the Phaedrus 
gets demonstrated, as an example, in (or, better: by) the Laches: namely, the fundamental 
importance for philosophical dialogue – and hence, understanding – that each dialogue partner 
sincerely aspires to understand the other, what they mean by their words, their respective ways 
of thinking and understanding, etc. so that, as a speaker, they can put their points in a way that 
ensures the best understanding on the part of their listener, and, as a listener, they can present 
their questions in a way that ensures the best understanding on the part of the speaker.
62
 
Having said this, it should then be noted how in a Socratic dialogue it is usually at least three, 
and not just two, things that go hand in hand. That the conversational partners understand one 
another is (in most cases) only a necessary condition for a successful understanding of a 
philosophical kind, albeit a very significant one. Besides the minimum number of two partici-
pants – ‘the subjects’ of the conversation – who each usually play the roles of both the speaker 
and the listener, there is ‘the object’ of the conversation (i.e. that which we would more 
colloquially call its ‘subject’). This is where the analogy between philosophy and (most kinds of) 
therapy ends – unless we imagine two doctors examining each other for the sake of learning 
about a certain illness or organ. Philosophy (Socratic philosophy, anyway), despite its emphasis 
on mutual understanding between its practising subjects, is not exclusively an attempt to under-
stand someone else, their feelings and opinions. But it is directed – in principle, approximately 
as much as at the other and ourselves – at the truth of things. This means, as I have stressed 
before, that it is important to appreciate the twofold function that is fulfilled by mutual 
understanding in philosophical discourse. Insofar as coming to understand (one) another brings 
about, hopefully (that is, if we don’t find in the end that we meant the same thing all along63), 
the acknowledgment of alternative perspectives on the world that were previously unknown to 
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 Remember also that the conversation of this dialogue is initiated by the question concerning the 
teaching of virtues. 
61
 As with the suggested interpretation of the ending of the Euthyphro in Section 1, I believe that the 
ending of the Laches suggested here is not only less generic than the standard ‘aporia’ hypothesis but 
actually helps explain one of the more abstract themes of the dialogue, viz. the way it might have been 
intended as an exemplar of ‘how to teach virtues (or, philosophy)’. (On this latter point see also (Cooper 
2007, 24) and (Vlastos 1994b, 6–7). 
62
 Ideally, this process would resemble the hermeneutic circle (or spiral?). If this structure gets 
thoroughly appreciated as part of Socrates’ method, then, against the received view, the elenchus will be 
seen to be of only subordinate importance to the underlying conception of philosophy. 
63
 This, it should be said, is itself a beautiful moment. 
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us, it brings about a new and philosophically different world (or a world with new things in it 
that we did not know before). In the most astonishing instances, it often means coming to see 
something most familiar to us—something ‘that we know too well’ and that is thus almost 
invisible to us—as though with a pair of new, different eyes: seeing connections we did not see 
before, making new, happy associations or appreciating differences where before everything 
used to appear as the same monotonous thing to us – much like when a good friend visits us and 
we guide them through our hometown. 
In the Laches, the twofold function of mutual understanding in philosophical discourse can 
be seen from the fact that, although they do not come very far in their understanding of the 
immediate object of their conversation (‘courage’)—and this is of course partly due to the 
considerable efforts they spend on reaching an understanding of each other, as argued in the 
foregoing—they nevertheless do also get somewhere in this respect; they can be said to have 
reached (the start of) a better understanding of what courage is. In fact, Plato makes this double 
function explicit in Nicias’ expressed anticipation before the actual examination starts (as 
quoted in Section 2, above). For not only does he mention the subjective examination of oneself 
and one’s beliefs, prejudices, etc. and those of one’s interlocutors, which the method involves, 
but equally, towards the end, the objective kind of learning that it involves, concerning one’s 
life and the world: 
NICIAS: You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with 
Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he 
began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on 
being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions 
about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has 
lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize 
that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last 
detail. … I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is 
willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, 
not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay 
more attention to the rest of his life. (Laches 187e–188b) 
In the Phaedrus, the interplay in philosophical understanding between mutual understanding on 
the one hand and understanding of the world on the other is clearly marked by Plato having 
Socrates not only remark on the importance of the former (‘you must understand the nature of 
the soul’ (277b)), but equally on the importance of the latter (‘you must know the truth 
concerning everything’ (277b)), in order to reach genuine philosophical understanding of 
anything in philosophical discourse. But there is one more, perhaps at this stage also more 
interesting, way in which the Phaedrus brings out the twofold function of mutual understanding, 
which I want to mention before closing this section. In the Phaedrus Plato has Socrates theorise 
about one of his most famous (or infamous) practices: ‘the (“unsuccessful”) search for 
How to Write Like Socrates Spoke? Wittgenstein & Plato on Mutual Understanding in Philosophy | 34 
essences’.64 As everyone knows, Socrates typically proceeds by (eliciting) attempts to formulate 
what something is in the form of a general definition, which, once formulated, he goes on to 
criticise and dismiss. Commentators like to point out that Socrates’ alleged ignorance, whether 
ironical or not, and also his ‘knowing that he does not know anything’, are illustrated by this 
practice. Now, in the Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates describe these two moments, i.e. the 
formulation of a definition and its subsequent criticism, in the following way: 
SOCRATES: The first consists in seeing together things that are scattered about 
everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each 
thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give. Just 
so with our discussion of love: Whether its definition was or was not 
correct, at least it allowed the speech to proceed clearly and consistently 
with itself. 
PHAEDRUS: And what is the other thing you are talking about, Socrates? 
SOCRATES: This, in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along 
its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might 
do. In just this way, our two speeches placed all mental derangements into 
one common kind. Then, just as each single body has parts that naturally 
come in pairs of the same name (one of them being called the right-hand 
and the other the left-hand one), so the speeches, having considered 
unsoundness of mind to be by nature one single kind within us, proceeded 
to cut it up—the first speech cut its left-hand part, and continued to cut 
until it discovered among these parts a sort of love that can be called ‘left-
handed,’ which it correctly denounced; the second speech, in turn, led us to 
the right-hand part of madness; discovered a love that shares its name with 
the other but is actually divine; set it out before us, and praised it as the 
cause of our greatest goods. 
PHAEDRUS: You are absolutely right. 
SOCRATES: Well, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, so 
that I may be able to think and to speak; . . . God knows whether this is the 
right name for those who can do this correctly or not, but so far I have 
always called them ‘dialecticians’. (Laches 265d–266c)65 
Let me try to paraphrase this presentation of a central aspect of the Socratic method(s). Socrates’ 
(elicitations of) attempts to define something can be understood as a purely heuristic method. 
Contrary to a common picture, Socrates need not actually be committed to believing that such 
essences can ever be formulated. Rather, from what we have seen in the preceding discussion, it 
appears that he uses this device mainly so that his interlocutors respond in the way he wishes 
them to and in order to lay a foundation for mutual understanding between the respective 
conversational partners by way of agreement as to the meaning of central terms of their subse-
quent discourse. It would be wrong, however, to think that on such an interpretation Socrates (or 
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 This is probably the most widely misunderstood (or abused) aspect of both the Socratic method and 
Plato’s philosophy. Wittgensteinians especially tend to think of this practice in the pejorative mode and it 
is frequently contrasted with Wittgenstein’s ideas about ‘family resemblance’, for instance. However, as I 
am arguing in the main text, this is quite clearly a mistake. 
65
 Commentators, wrongly, have often not believed the Phaedrus’ Socrates when he says that he 
himself is a ‘lover of these divisions’, but tend to ascribe the so-called ‘method of divisions’ exclusively 
to the mature Plato instead (esp. in the Sophist and Statesman). 
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Plato) turned out to be some sort of sceptic or nominalist.
66
 For, as Socrates points out, the 
criticism of formulated definitions, which follows every definition, is what really enables us to 
approach the thing we are interested in as it is (‘along its natural joints’). 
The Socratic use of definitions, thus understood, is not only much less naïvely (or, 
metaphysically) realistic than usually portrayed, but actually quite close to the way analytic 
philosophers have always wanted to work. And arguably Wittgenstein’s later method of 
language-games, understood as the stipulation of (and subsequent reflection on) objects of 
comparison (centres of variation) ‘which, through similarities and dissimiliarities, are meant to 
throw light on features of our language’ (PI §130), bears a strikingly close resemblance to this 
Socratic technique.
67
 However, the key to appreciating these similarities between the Socratic 
method and Wittgenstein’s lies in the acknowledgement of the oft-neglected role which the 
mutual understanding between the participants of a Socratic conversation plays in (the more 
general kind of) philosophical understanding of the world.  
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 Note that in denying this I do not mean to argue in favour of a ‘realist’ interpretation of Plato or 
Socrates either. 
67
 Cf. my related discussions in Sections 4 and 4.1. On Wittgenstein’s method of language-games see 
the lucid presentation in (Kuusela 2008), as well as the discussion in (Kuusela forthcoming). 
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4 Plato’s problem of writing Socratic philosophy and Wittgenstein’s 
‘feat of writing’ 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the preceding section, Plato discusses not just philosophy as 
such in the Phaedrus but also the various forms it can take, in particular: oratory/speech-giving, 
personal dialogue/conversation (dialectic) and writing. After having looked mainly at the first 
two of these – but especially at the second – in the previous section, I now want to turn my 
attention towards the third: writing. Being familiar with what is widely thought of as Plato’s 
disregard for the fine arts, one might think, however, that Socrates’ verdict about philosophical 
writing in the Phaedrus is really not too surprising: 
SOCRATES: You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The 
offsprings of painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them 
anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of written 
words. You’d think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, 
but if you question anything that has been said because you want to learn 
more, it continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it has 
once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching 
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no 
business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its 
father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own 
support. (Phaedrus 275d–e) 
Perhaps we can find here the philosophical reason why Socrates left no written legacy. In any 
case, the consequences of this critique, I believe, are highly interesting and complex. As this 
passage continues, we further read Socrates saying that anyone with only the slightest 
understanding of philosophy will have to dismiss any attempt at writing serious philosophy. A 
philosopher could only write down philosophical thoughts for their own amusement, or perhaps 
as an aid to memory. But teaching the art of philosophy in the form of written words and 
without the live and direct support of their author is strictly impossible, or so Socrates argues: 
SOCRATES: Therefore, he won’t be serious about writing them in ink, sowing them, 
through a pen, with words that are as incapable of speaking in their own 
defense as they are of teaching the truth adequately.’ (Phaedrus 276c)68 
Hence, the only legitimate kind of serious philosophical communication, according to Plato’s 
Socrates in the Phaedrus, is ‘the living, breathing discourse’ (276a). (Obviously, speech-writing, 
or lecturing for that matter, is ultimately no better than writing as such.) As the discussion in 
previous sections showed, according to a Socratic conception of philosophy it is only in direct 
personal dialogue that philosophical questions can be met with appropriate responses. Only in 
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 See Phaedrus 276a–d. See also my discussion of ‘golden truths’ in Section 2, above; and the related 
discussion of ‘literal truths’ in the present section, below. 
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direct personal conversation can we reasonably expect to achieve genuine mutual understanding 
between our conversational partners and ourselves with regard to any philosophical subject. But 
this kind of mutual understanding, as we saw in the foregoing section, is a necessary means, 
when following the Socratic method, of establishing any shared philosophical understanding of 
the world. Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedrus contends that writing, however, has no realistic 
hopes whatsoever of achieving this. 
Socrates, one would assume, was a happy and serious philosopher. If he really believed what 
Plato has him say in the Phaedrus, then we would now understand better why he might have 
practised philosophy exclusively via the spoken word and in spontaneous conversation. 
Concerning Plato, however, as the author of this dialogue, the situation seems less straightfor-
ward. Could he seriously be using Socrates as a mouthpiece here?
69
 It would seem not, for 
otherwise he would appear to be effectively contradicting himself by writing that philosophical 
writing is impossible. Or is the Phaedrus perhaps not intended as ‘serious’ philosophy? Is it 
merely an entertaining piece, or written for private purposes only? None of these questions seem 
likely to receive a positive answer from any serious scholar. But what, then, are we to say? – I 
shall come back to this question. First, I want to dwell a little more on the underlying problem 
of writing Socratic philosophy. 
As we have seen from the examples of Socrates, Plato and Wittgenstein in the course of the 
first three sections of this essay, there is arguably a notion of a philosophical problem according 
to which (at least some)
70
 philosophical problems are essentially person-relative. According to 
this notion of a philosophical problem, the problem persists for as long as it is manifest in the 
expressions or behaviour of the individual for whom it is a problem.
71
 Such a notion of a 
philosophical problem may have the most intuitive appeal when the respective problems take 
the Socratic form of ‘What is courage?’, ‘What is justice?’, ‘What is meaning?’, ‘What is the 
meaning of a word?’, ‘What is philosophy?’ or ‘What is a philosophical problem?’.72 Moreover, 
person-relative problems require solutions that are equally person-relative. One way of 
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 This position has most notably been defended by Gregory Vlastos. More recently Christopher Rowe 
has suggested a new version of it in his Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing (2007). 
70
 The notion need by no means be dogmatic but can allow for other compatible notions; e.g. a 
historically oriented one according to which we could say, for instance, that the problems of early analytic 
philosophy, for instance of logicism and logical atomism, have for the most part been ‘solved’ by the 
present generation of academic philosophers (which might be false but is not therefore senseless); 
political philosophers, it further seems to me, also work on many questions, and thus on problems, that 
are philosophical but that are not essentially the problems of an individual. 
71
 This leaves it open whether the individual acknowledges that they have the respective problem, as 
in the case of Laches in the Laches, or whether the person professes not to have it, as with Euthyphro in 
the Euthyphro. 
72
 Cf. also the kind of questions Wittgenstein introduces at the beginning of The Blue Book: ‘The 
questions “What is length?”, “What is meaning?”, “What is the number one?” etc., produce in us a mental 
cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something’ (BlB 
1). 
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conceiving of the person-relativity of a problem is to let ‘solutions’ wear the trousers for once, 
rather than ‘the problem’. The thought could go something like this: you only really know what 
the problem is when you have found its solution.
73
 (This, it seems to me, actually describes a 
common experience of philosophical understanding.) 
For example, we could also regard the problem of other minds as belonging to this set of 
problems. Many solutions have been suggested, advocated – and thus accepted – by at least a 
small number of individuals. Some people notably think that there is no such problem as the 
problem of other minds at all, and take this to be its solution (or dissolution). – Now, it might be 
objected that this is only to suggest something like the claim that e.g. the term ‘the problem of 
other minds’ denotes a class of problems rather than one singular problem and hence a really 
rather trivial and unoriginal thing to come up with. But then one only has to point out that if 
such a class can be individuated essentially by reference to individual persons then that is 
exactly what the relevant notion of philosophical problems is about. In other words, applying 
the general thought above to this potential instance: you only really know what someone’s 
problem about other minds is, or was, when you have found its solution, that is, when that 
someone ceases to have the problem (either because they now know how to answer the question 
which plagued them satisfactorily, or because the problem just goes away, does not play a role 
in their life any more). 
Along the same lines as Plato’s Phaedrus, it can be said that it is this kind of notion of a 
philosophical problem which can make it difficult to see how anyone could write anything 
useful concerning its solution(s) – because, consequently, there are about as many solutions as 
there are individuals trying to find one. — Now, it should be stressed that the problem of 
writing Socratic philosophy does not solely arise from a notion of philosophical ‘problems’ but 
equally from a notion of philosophical ‘understanding’. As argued before: whether the questions 
we are dealing with take the form of an open-ended enquiry into some aspect of human life or 
other without prejudice or presumption (‘what is the F?’)74 or whether they take the form instead 
of an intellectual anxiety (‘do philosophical zombies have consciousness?’), systematic perplex-
ity (‘how can I prove physicalism?’) or traumatic confusion (‘how do I know that I can trust this 
person or anyone else?’), a philosophical enquiry – conducted in a Socratic spirit as described in 
the present essay – will usually have, besides the negative effect of ridding one of a problem, 
the positive effect of yielding some objective insight or understanding. But the form such an 
understanding takes will in each case depend on the kinds of misunderstanding or prejudice 
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 See also my discussion of §43 and the story about Wittgenstein and the child in Section 2, above. 
74
 Of course, such a question can be asked in all sorts of ways, as the Laches vividly demonstrates (see 
my discussion in Section 3, above). Ultimately there is no right form of expression to guide such an 
enquiry. Whether an enquiry is led in an open-minded manner in this sense depends on the many factors 
which characterise the respective enquiry, not on the (surface-) grammatical form of the question. But the 
same holds, of course, for the other examples in the text. That’s the point. – And something very similar 
also holds in the case of potential answers. 
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which stand in its way. However, these are likely to be different between different individuals or 
even for the same person at different times. For example, someone’s understanding of the role 
that ‘reference’ plays in human communication might be enhanced by means of pointing out 
that when N.N. dies it still makes sense to say ‘N.N. has died’.75 But someone else might find 
this trivial. Or someone might think, ‘this is a complicated case of reference, but not a puzzle 
that cannot be solved somehow!’, and start trying to solve the puzzle. Similarly, when I say 
‘don’t think, but look!’ or ‘meaning is use’, or tell you a story about a shopkeeper selling five 
red apples, I might just be trying to tell you the very same thing over and over again. And you 
might understand me, and hence understand whatever it is that I have been trying to tell you. Or 
you might not understand me to be saying the same thing in each case – and you would be right 
– and might nevertheless understand whatever it is that I was trying to tell you. But whether, 
and how, you understand is entirely dependent on you. — In this manner, for example, it is not 
only philosophical problems but equally philosophical understanding that can involve essential 
parameters that are dependent on a particular individual, and hence can lead to the problem of 
writing Socratic philosophy. Every speaker of English who has mastered the language well
76
 
can use the same recipe to bake a cake (at least, in principle), but it seems there are no such 
universal recipes for gaining philosophical insights. And it would be rather surprising, to say the 
least, to find out that this was a mere deficiency of the English language.
77
 
So the problem of writing Socratic philosophy could be expressed, then, in the following 
way: the degree of the diversity of person-relative methods for solving what still appears to be 
one philosophical problem is proportional to the difficulty of conveying the solution(s) to a 
philosophical problem in writing to one’s readers. And if we have any hope at all, then this 
could give expression to our challenge of writing Socratic philosophy: How to write philosophy 
in the way Socrates practised it in speech? 
Or we could look at it this way. On the one hand, personal conversation grants one all the 
flexibility that the particular character of another person’s understanding might require in order 
to achieve any (mutual or objective) philosophical understanding regarding a given question. 
Writing, on the other hand, constrains one in a number of ways, so that it becomes difficult to 
deal with person-relative characteristics of understanding. Following this line of thought, the 
problem could also be said to consist in the following: the person-relative character of (at least 
some) philosophical problems stands in opposition to philosophy’s aspirations to abstraction 
and generality, in particular in its desire to reach a large, perhaps indefinite, and hence 
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 See my discussion of PI §§40–42 in Section 2, above. 
76
 What I mean is, roughly, to the extent that they can get on with their daily lives at the approximate 
level of a native speaker. 
77
 Is this a paradox: ‘Philosophical truths cannot be carved in stone’? 
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anonymous audience or readership.
78
 The challenge of writing Socratic philosophy may, then, 
be expressed in the following question: how can one write philosophy in a way that is equiva-
lent to talking to a potentially infinite number of conversational partners, one by one (as in a 
series of actual personal conversations) and yet all at the same time (as in a text written, 
literally once and for all)? 
Having thus more fully identified the problem of writing Socratic philosophy as presented in 
Plato’s Phaedrus, it will now be useful to broaden the picture just a little bit, and briefly look at 
a few related instances of reflective authorship in the history of western philosophy. 
Here, for example, is a passage from R. G. Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical 
Method (1933), whose relevance for – and indeed striking similarity to – our present concerns 
should already be quite obvious at this stage: 
Every piece of philosophical writing is primarily addressed by the author to himself. Its 
purpose is not to select from among his thoughts those of which he is certain and to 
express those, but the very opposite: to fasten upon the difficulties and obscurities in 
which he finds himself involved, and try, if not to solve or remove them, at least to 
understand them better. The philosopher is forced to work in this way by the inextricable 
unity of the object which he studies . . . in thinking of it, therefore, he must always be 
probing into the darkest parts, as a guide trying to keep his party together must always be 
hastening the hindmost. The philosopher therefore, in the course of his business, must 
always be confessing his difficulties. . . . [P]hilosophical writing [is] essentially a 
confession, a search by the mind for its own failings and an attempt to remedy them by 
recognizing them. 
In reading the philosophers, we ‘follow’ them: that is, we understand what they think, and 
reconstruct in ourselves, so far as we can, the processes by which they have come to think 
it. . . . The reader of a philosophical work is committing himself to the enterprise of living 
through the same experience that his author lived through; if for lack of sympathy, 
patience, or any other quality he cannot do this, his reading is worthless. 
In this respect philosophy resembles poetry. (Collingwood 1933, 209 ff.) 
Wittgenstein, too, thought that in an important sense philosophy should resemble poetry 
(‘Dichtung’ (CV, 28)). But contrary to what Collingwood appears to have thought, Wittgenstein 
took this to be a challenge primarily for the author rather than for the reader (as we will soon see 
more clearly). My discussion in the following will focus, however, on practical attempts to 
solve these problems, i.e. resolutions which result in alternative forms of writing as opposed to 
theoretical attempts which result in alternative forms of reading (at most). There is no shortage 
of examples of practical reflective authorship of this kind in the history of western philosophy. 
Besides Plato and Wittgenstein, Friedrich Nietzsche
79
 and Søren Kierkegaard
80
 spring to mind. 
Also worth mentioning, perhaps, are Michel De Montaigne, Johann Georg Hamann and his 
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 These ‘aspirations’, it seems to me, are also shared by most philosophers currently working in the 
analytic tradition. Cf. my brief discussion in the postscript of this essay, below. 
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 See e.g. (Conant 2014, II.4) 
80
 See e.g. (Conant 1996) and (Phillips 1992). 
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pupil Johann Gottfried Herder; Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, but also George Berkeley and 
David Hume, or René Descartes. A more recent example is Stanley Cavell.
81
 
We can distinguish at least the following three kinds of practical resolution for one’s writing 
that one may choose between in the face of the problem of writing Socratic philosophy. First, 
we can choose not to write (or can we?), like Socrates did. Second, we can decide to retreat and 
write merely for ourselves, privately (or, ‘confessionally’, as Collingwood calls it). This manner 
of writing would correspond to what Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedrus describes as for one’s 
own memory or that of those who know as well as we do what we are writing about. 
Montaigne’s Essais (1588), for instance, are consciously written in such a confessional style.82 
In the preface, Montaigne warns us somewhat paradoxically: ‘So, reader, I am myself the 
substance of my book, and there is no reason why you should waste your leisure on so frivolous 
and unrewarding a subject’ (Montaigne 1588, [23]). Montaigne’s ‘confessional’ approach found 
expression not only in the explicitly personal character of his work, disclosing some of his most 
private opinions, but equally in the ways he made revisions to his published work. For, in 
revised editions, instead of deleting or correcting ‘mistakes’, Montaigne simply added more 
material, thus increasing the degree to which the document could testify to his life and 
biography. 
Third, we can resolve to compromise, and try to find ways of overcoming the obstacles to 
writing serious Socratic philosophy that can be of genuinely instructive value for others. This is 
the route Plato seems to have embarked upon, and Wittgenstein, I believe, can equally be said to 
have done so. And for much of the remainder of this essay, I shall be trying to make the case 
that this is an interesting and worthwhile way of looking at Wittgenstein’s second masterwork, 
a.k.a. Philosophical Investigations, and to indicate why I think that Cavell is right in responding 
to it essentially ‘as a feat of writing’ (Cavell 1979, xvii). 
In approaching the kind of ‘active’ attempts at resolving the problem of writing Socratic 
philosophy, i.e. attempts of the third (or, Platonic) type, it will be instructive to look for a 
moment at an example from Descartes. As something of a mix of a confessional style and 
something that aspires to more, this seems apt to lead us in the right direction with respect to 
action. There have been a handful of commentators who argue for an essentially first-person-
perspective usage of Descartes’ Cogito argument in his Meditations (1641). Most recently, 
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 In many cases the literary quality (or, better: the philosophical significance of the literariness) of 
philosophers’ writing has been shamefully neglected. This is of course the case with Plato’s dialogues. 
Generally, and not at all surprisingly it seems to me, commentators from the analytic tradition have been 
most negligent in this respect. Most adaptations of Nietzsche’s work are gross mistreatments of his rather 
explicit remarks on how to read him. Somewhat ironically, the analytic tradition that continues to thrive 
can be said to have sprung from one particular instance of such a misreading: the misreading of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1922) (see also Footnote 88, below). 
82
 This is in contrast with Augustine’s Confessiones (398AD), for example, whose literary form is due 
to religious considerations rather than strictly philosophical ones. 
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perhaps, Raymond Tallis has argued that the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, in Descartes’ argument 
plays a special role which is overlooked by objections such as Russell’s (but also Lichtenberg’s), 
according to which all one could infer from Descartes’ argument was that ‘it thinks’, ‘there is 
thinking’ or ‘there are thoughts’ but not that a soul, subject, or person was thinking. And I agree 
with Tallis that it is a common mistake of such accounts to ignore the fundamentally person-
relative dimension of the argument. As he puts it, 
it is necessary to see the Cogito argument from the first-person point of view – imagining 
it from within – and as something that exists not as a type, but as an indefinite number of 
token proofs actually being undertaken . . . by an individual and as providing grounds for 
resistance to particular doubts experienced by particular individuals at particular moments, 
rather than as an objective proof or the proof of some objective fact. (Tallis 2005, 28) 
Hence, contrary to common belief, Tallis argues, Descartes does not simply invite the reader to 
learn about his (Descartes’) astonishing discoveries in the Meditations. Rather, the reader is 
invited to actively perform some of the lines of thought described in the book. In the case of the 
Cogito argument, this means that, as Tallis puts it, ‘the argument as it is usually set out on the 
page – as an argument type – is best seen as a recipe for philosophers to demonstrate something 
to themselves. Something, in short, that indicates work to be done off the page’ (Tallis 2005, 
28). 
In addition to the point about this particular argument, we find that in the specially written 
Preface to the Reader, Descartes in fact expresses significant concerns about person-relative 
parameters that may play a role in understanding him. Descartes writes, ‘as I do not presume so 
much on my own powers as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause difficulty 
to anyone, I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I 
persuade myself’ (Descartes 1641, Preface to the Reader).83 But Descartes not only explicitly 
acknowledges his personal commitment to the text of the Meditations (their ‘confessional’ 
character), what is more, as the passage continues he describes his decision to publish alongside 
this first part of the book the Objections and Replies as being motivated by the same reasons. It 
is his explicit intention to enrich his personal mode of understanding, as set out in the first part, 
with the perspectives of others, hence his asking the likes of Thomas Hobbes and the theologian 
Antoine Arnauld to share their thoughts. Thus, in addition to the more implicit point about the 
Cogito, here we have Descartes’ explicit reflection on his elaborate attempt to actively address 
his readers’ individual modes of understanding, which he acknowledges to be importantly 
different from his own. 
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 See also Anthony Kenny: ‘Wittgenstein’s insistence that philosophy is something that each man 
must do for himself, and which is a matter of the will, not of the intellect, resembles most of all the 
philosopher with whom he is most frequently contrasted, René Descartes. Descartes’s philosophical 
masterpiece was not a textbook but a series of meditations which each person must go through for himself; 
the doubt and the cogito was a discipline which each person must administer to himself’ (Kenny 1982, 
26). 
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Descartes’ Meditations can therefore be regarded as perhaps one of the most prominent 
examples of a philosophical text which attempts to actively address its readers in their various 
individual, personal modes of understanding. At the same time, however, considering the large 
group of albeit very intelligent readers who could not be reached in this way (e.g. Russell, but 
perhaps even more surprisingly Lichtenberg), Descartes’ example also reveals its own 
limitations. In this respect, Descartes’ Meditations are rather like Montaigne’s Essais. Both 
works are essentially historical records. In Descartes’ case, however, it is the historical record 
not only of the author’s coming to understand something but including, furthermore, the 
author’s attempts to explain what it is that he has understood to a group of selected individuals 
who in turn explain their difficulties in understanding the original account of the author.
84
 Given 
the extent to which Descartes failed in this authorial enterprise, it has to be noted, once again, 
that a mere recipe form of philosophical instruction, as Tallis also describes it, will not be 
enough to overcome the kind of problem we are presently concerned with – or will do so only in 
particular cases and only for very few and ever fewer of us – and therefore will not suffice for 
the purposes of a genuinely Socratic way of writing philosophy either. 
Plato’s dialogues are different in this respect from Descartes’ Objections and Replies in the 
Meditations. Regardless of whether scholars will ever agree about the relation between the voice 
of Socrates
85
 and that of Plato in each of the various dialogues,
86
 the simple fact that the author’s 
voice does not explicitly appear in the text makes all the difference. It is again the Phaedrus 
which constitutes a salient example for our understanding of Plato’s authorship in this respect. 
Imagine, if Plato had indeed assigned his own name to the voice of Socrates in this dialogue: 
would this not have made it even more, and to a regrettable extent, the historical record of the 
author’s contradiction or self-doubt at a particular point in time? But how much more there is, 
given that we do not have any such explicit identification – that is, more for us readers to do, 
more for us to think about, and thus more for us to learn! – John Cooper aptly summarises the 
situation towards the end of the dialogue as follows: 
Writings cannot contain or constitute knowledge of any important matter. Knowledge can 
only be lodged in a mind, and its essential feature there is an endless capacity to express, 
interpret, and reinterpret itself suitably, in response to every challenge—something a 
written text once let go by its author plainly lacks: it can only keep on repeating the same 
words to whoever picks it up. But does not a Platonic dialogue, in engaging its reader in a 
creative, multilayered intellectual encounter, have a similar capacity for ever-deeper 
reading, for the discovery of underlying meaning beyond the simple presentation of its 
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 When one considers the particular historicity of the Objections and Replies, it becomes almost 
understandable that there are many editions on the market today which simply leave them out. 
85
 It should be noted that in some dialogues the prime candidate for being designated Plato’s 
‘spokesperson’ is not Socrates, e.g. in the Parmenides. 
86
 However, I do agree with Cooper, once more, on this question: ‘Plato as author of the dialogue 
stands back from the words of his spokesmen and withholds his full commitment; . . . it is through the 
writing as a whole that Plato speaks to the reader, not through any single character’s words’ (Cooper 1999, 
29 ff.). 
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surface ideas? Knowledge is only in souls, but, despite the Phaedrus’ own critique of 
writing, reading such a dialogue may be a good way of working to attain it. (Cooper 
1997b, 507) 
I agree with Cooper, entirely, that it is ‘a good way’. It is a good attempt by Plato at writing the 
kind of philosophy he had learnt from his teacher Socrates in spoken discourse. It is much better 
than Descartes’ Objections and Replies, in particular; not merely because of Plato’s use of 
fictional characters but furthermore due to his respecting all or most of the characteristics of 
Socratic philosophising listed in Section 1 above, and more. Thus Plato manages, as was noted 
earlier, not only to instruct us with regard to some particular phenomenon (like piety, justice, 
friendship) but also to instruct us with regard to a method, and does so, moreover, in a way that 
does not try to make us believe something but that actually makes us do something (like an 
example, or series of examples, that breaks off only so as to let us – or make us – continue for 
ourselves). 
Hence, it could be said, the reason why Plato’s dialogues come ever so much closer to 
resembling the live Socratic practice of direct personal conversation resides in the fact that, as 
reception history impressively demonstrates, Plato does not just let his readers think but actually 
makes them do so – and has done so successfully, in uncountably many individual cases and to 
an extent that stands, almost incredibly, unrivalled for more than two thousand years in the 
western tradition of writing philosophical texts. 
Now here along comes Wittgenstein, being critical of it all: 
Imagine you are taking a walk together with another person, and you are deep in 
conversation. In the course of this conversation you would sometimes slow down and 
sometimes accelerate your pace, again and again coming to a halt at various points. As 
these interruptions of your walk are immediate outcomes of the life of the conversation, a 
listener will find them quite natural. Now let’s suppose that only the substance of the 
conversation is reproduced by someone (who may be translating it into another language), 
and in order to do so it would be necessary to walk the same path, marking the spots 
where the first time round pauses were made. These enforced interruptions of your walk, 
though originally they helped the flow of the conversation, will now be perceived as 
extremely disruptive. Similarly with the translation of the Platonic dialogues into 
dialogue form. Only once, in the original course of the conversation, the affirmative and 
negative responses were natural and helpful resting points. In the translation they are 
agonizing, irritating slowdowns. (MS 153a, 117v–199r; MS 111, 192 ff., translation by 
Joachim Schulte)
87
 
Wittgenstein here seems to criticise Plato for reasons very similar to the ones that I just cited 
against Descartes and in favour of Plato. Wittgenstein effectively says that Plato’s dialogues are 
in an important respect still a mere historical record which, in particular, results in disruptions of 
the flow of reading that are unnatural to most readers and hence counterproductive to their 
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 Wittgenstein had many conflicting things to say about Plato and Socrates, and many half-baked 
criticisms that seem to me to be unfair. However, this one does seem fair. (See (Biesenbach 2014) for the 
most comprehensive collection of Wittgenstein’s references and allusions to Plato and Socrates.) 
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understanding. And in principle, it must be said, Wittgenstein is surely right. This is, fundamen-
tally, a problem of Plato’s dialogues that is widely acknowledged. Still, Wittgenstein’s criticism 
reads a bit like an out-of-proportion ‘Must do better.’ But the obvious question is: how? — In 
the following, then, I shall try to answer this question. 
I shall argue that Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations can be characterised as a 
special form of writing in which one leading principle of composition is that it should enable as 
many readers as possible to have something like a live Socratic dialogue with the resulting text, 
and hence prompt them to address their individual philosophical problems and modes of 
understanding, in accordance with their individual philosophical problems and modes of 
understanding; furthermore, I shall argue that in this respect Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations transcend Plato’s best dialogues. 
 
‘So that . . . the spirit should receive its due.’ 
In 1929, after ten years away from philosophy, Wittgenstein had grown more and more 
discontent with his early work, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1922), upon the completion 
of which he had believed himself ‘to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the 
problems’ (TLP, Preface). One reason for his growing discontent might have been, not just that 
he came to see minor mistakes such as the original neglect of the colour exclusion problem but 
that he felt the need to improve the expression of some of the central thoughts that it contained 
concerning, e.g. the nature of philosophical problems, ‘the correct method in philosophy’ (6.53), 
the role of logic and the limits of sense. For one thing, no one seemed to have understood it (not 
even Russell, as Wittgenstein complained on numerous occasions). Another reason might have 
been that he didn’t quite understand his earlier self any more.88 
In the Tractatus itself, Wittgenstein had already mentioned that in terms of clarity of 
expression, he was ‘conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible’ (TLP, 
Preface). Now, in the 1930s, after his return to academic philosophy, he made several attempts 
at an improved linear style of presentation of his new approach. About six years later, however, 
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 Hence, insofar as from the perspective of the present essay, it does not seem unlikely that 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus had mainly failed with regard to his ‘—enormous—difficulty of expression’ 
(MS 102, 68r [8 March 1915], my translation), it can still be the case that he had in fact ‘found, on all 
essential points, the final solution of the problems’, namely in the sense that for him at the time the 
expression seemed right and it enabled him ‘to break off philosophizing’ (PI §133). It is as though the 
historicity of the Tractatus’ form of writing, its limitedness in only really being the ‘erlösende Wort’ for 
one particular person at one particular time, started to dawn on Wittgenstein only once it had ceased to 
work for himself. (But it did not dawn on him quite so immediately. First people such as Frank P. Ramsey, 
Moritz Schlick and other members of the Vienna Circle made him believe, once more – if only for a 
relatively short while, viz. approximately until the end of 1931 – that the project he had formerly come to 
see for himself as ultimately nonsensical (i.e., roughly, the ‘picture-theory’) might perhaps be made to 
work after all (hence his initial work on several ‘picture-theory’-related questions upon his return to 
Cambridge).) 
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he finally rejected a linear style of presentation and settled instead on the non-linear, criss-cross 
style of interrelated remarks and aphorisms which led to the text which has been posthumously 
published as Philosophical Investigations.
89
 In the draft of a preface, which has been – fittingly 
– published alongside it, Wittgenstein writes, ‘my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force 
them along a single track against their natural inclination. —– And this was, of course, 
connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in 
every direction over a wide field of thought. . . . So this book is really just an album’ (PI, 
Preface). Furthermore, towards the end of this preface Wittgenstein adds, ‘I should not like my 
writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to 
thoughts of his own’ (PI, Preface). This remark towards the end of the preface, importantly, 
does not seem to me to be a mere cliché. Essentially the same point, as I understand it, was at an 
earlier time once put by Wittgenstein in the following way: ‘I must be nothing more than the 
mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance 
can set it in order’ (CV, 25e [22.11.1931]). However, it was only later (after the autumn of 1936) 
that he came to understand the implications of this latter simile more fully. For, as we are now 
in a position to say, this meant not only that he had to be ‘nothing more than a mirror’ but 
equally that he had to be nothing less either. The real difficulty, then, does not consist in 
becoming a mirror, but in becoming a mirror and then making your readers look into that mirror. 
In other words, it means that he had to be nothing more or less than a speaking mirror. 
At around the time when Wittgenstein came to realise that he therefore had to abandon all 
attempts at a linear text for the teaching of his new philosophical approach in written form, i.e. 
at about the time he composed the first version of Philosophical Investigations (‘part I’) up until 
Section 188 as we know them today, we find Wittgenstein – perhaps not wholly coincidentally 
– reflecting on Kierkegaard’s writing and also on the Bible: 
Kierkegaard writes: If Christianity were so easy and cosy, why would God have moved 
Heaven & Earth in his Scripture, threatened eternal punishments –. – Question: But why 
is this Scripture so unclear then? If we want to warn someone of a terrible danger, do we 
do it by giving him a riddle to solve, whose solution is perhaps the warning? – But who is 
to say that the Scripture really is unclear: isn’t it possible that it was essential in this case 
to tell a riddle? That a more direct warning, on the other hand, would necessarily have 
had the wrong effect? (CV 36e [22.10.1937]) 
Wittgenstein’s reflections can be transferred, quite directly, onto his own writing of the 
Investigations at the time. For instance, at their very beginning: did he not equally have reasons 
to caution against asking certain questions in the following, rather indirect way? After 
introducing the famous language-game of the shopkeeper who manages to sell five red apples 
using a shopping list which says ‘five red apples’, Wittgenstein has this short dialogue follow: 
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 See also Pichler’s detailed account of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the linear style of the Brown Book 
complex in (Pichler 2004); cf. also (Pichler 2007). 
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“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to 
do with the word ‘five’?” —– Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. 
Explanations come to an end somewhere. – But what is the meaning of the word “five”? – 
No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used. (PI §1) 
Surely, he could have written: ‘don’t ask this question’? Or, ‘don’t ask this question in a way as 
to suggest there must be more to the meaning of the word than its mere use in this language-
game’? But it seems that apparently he could not have done so: any more direct warning, 
Wittgenstein appears to have thought, would likely have had ‘the wrong effect’ in this case 
too.
90
 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on the Bible continue as follows: 
God has four people recount the life of the incarnate God [i.e. the Four Christian 
Evangelists’ stories of Jesus, viz. Matthew’s, Mark’s, Luke’s and John’s], each one 
differently, & contradicting each other – but can’t we say: It is important that this 
narrative should not have more than quite middling historical plausibility, just so that this 
should not be taken as the essential, decisive thing. So that the letter should not be 
believed more strongly than is proper & the spirit should receive its due. (CV 36e 
[22.10.1937]) 
Similarly, it could be said, in the present case, it is a particular spirit in which one might be 
tempted to ask the question ‘what is the meaning of the word “five”?’ which might be 
problematic, but not the question as such, not ‘the letter’ (i.e. not this series of words). For, in 
principle, the same question could also be posed by someone who wishes to ask ‘how (else) is 
the word “five” used in the world of the shopkeeper, as compared with the way we normally use 
numerals?’, for instance (which of course would be quite close to what Wittgenstein would 
actually like us to think about in this passage). Thus, Wittgenstein’s indirect form of expression 
in this example allows someone who doesn’t feel a need for the problematic kind of question to 
simply go on reading, as it were with no ‘enforced interruptions of their walk’.91 Only someone 
who does feel the problematic need to ask for the ‘real’ meaning of the word ‘five’ would be 
prompted to pause and think, or thus appears to be Wittgenstein’s intention. It is as though with 
the language-game of the shopkeeper, Wittgenstein has found one form of expression which 
allows him to bend ‘the letter’ in such a way that ‘the spirit’ could receive its due. 
But the passage quoted above might give us another hint in this direction. Namely, insofar as 
Wittgenstein speaks here of the potential effects of a text whose structure he conceives of as 
essentially dialogical, the passage can be seen in close connection with his above-mentioned 
criticism of Plato’s dialogues. Just as we saw was the problem with Descartes’ Meditations, so it 
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 As we saw in Section 2, the apparently most ‘explicit’ expression in PI §43 can indeed be said to 
have had the wrong effect in many instances. See also the discussion of such wrong effects in (Conant 
1998). (Had Wittgenstein lived to witness the tragic story of this one remark, Section 43 would have been 
among the first to be cut out again.) 
91
 A reader like this might, for example, go on reading thinking that ‘this must be in preparation for 
some “deeper” questions to be introduced at a later stage’ (and for this particular reader, in fact, it might 
be), or simply thinking nothing in particular while skimming over this short interlude. 
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can now equally be said of Plato that his dialogues, when measured against the possible ideal of 
‘Socratic writing’, remain too much the historical record of a dialogue as it once (could have) 
happened. In other words, there is still too much of an attempt at a literal philosophical truth in 
Plato’s dialogues, which both Socrates and Wittgenstein considered to be a mere chimaera 
created by an illusion of meaning, ‘[a]s if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with 
it’ (PI §117), ‘as if they are alive, . . . as if they had some understanding (Phaedrus 275d); or, 
conversely, there is still too little attempt at bending the letter in such a way that the spirit (and 
hence each individual reader) receives its due. 
In this respect, the following differences require emphasis. For instance, unlike Plato’s dia-
logues, Wittgenstein’s dialogical passages do not allow for the identification of voices.92 As 
remarked earlier, on close inspection, it is often anything but clear which voice, if any, might be 
Wittgenstein’s own. We are instead confronted with a hermetic structure of various unidentifia-
ble voices.
93
 Not only are there no assigned names, but at times the artful juxtaposition of 
exclamations, questions and arguments does not even allow one to distinguish the limits 
between one anonymous voice and another.
94
 Furthermore, what has often been criticised as 
Wittgenstein’s apparently inconsistent use of quotation marks and scare quotes, could thus be 
seen as a systematic strategy to prevent readers from attempting to identify consistent voices in 
the text. Hence, readers are forced to ask themselves who is speaking, who might actually want 
to say such a thing, and why? They will be disinclined to believe whatever they read, be more 
critical, and may eventually change their reading attitude altogether, more frequently stop 
reading and actually start thinking; furthermore, readers are thus made to identify different lines 
of thought and develop their own, personal focus.
95
 Thus, we have here one technique by which 
Wittgenstein can be seen to improve on Plato’s dialogues in terms of a truly Socratic form of 
writing, namely through an even higher degree to which readers are not merely allowed but 
actually made to think independently when engaging with his text. 
But now it might be objected that, even if all this were correct, still none of the examples 
discussed in this essay up to this point have met the challenge of writing Socratic philosophy, 
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 I should mention, however, that Plato at least does not always specify the respective speaker’s name 
before their speech. See e.g. the Protagoras. Yet I could not point to any one passage in Plato where there 
is any doubt as to who (i.e. which character) is speaking. 
93
 When looked at in this way, Cavell’s model comprising only two types of voices reaches its limits 
(cf. ‘The voice of temptation and the voice of correctness are the antagonists in Wittgenstein’s dialogues’ 
(Cavell 1962, [71])). For example, it is not clear whether the central statement of §43 should be assigned 
the voice of the moderator (M) or that of Hans (the ‘linguistic dogmatist’). 
94
 On the difficulty of identifying voices in the PI see also (Schulte 2013, 18). 
95
 In order to see the effect of this, imagine Wittgenstein had made it unmistakably clear who he 
thought was saying what in a dialogue, for example by assigning his own name to certain remarks, e.g. 
‘The sentence “Sensations are private” is comparable to “One plays patience by oneself”’ or ‘I follow the 
rule blindly’ (cf. also the end of §217, for instance). Perhaps this would help us determine what this great 
man might have thought with respect to a wonderful-sounding phrase at one time or other. But would it 
help us with the philosophy? It would quite certainly help us less. 
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since Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedrus does not deny the possibility of a serious philosophical 
text that makes its readers think for themselves; the problem, rather, was that every text would 
seem to, firstly, reach ‘indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have 
no business with it’ (Phaedrus 275e), and, secondly, ‘when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it 
always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support’ 
(Phaedrus 275e). — However, as indicated by my discussion of the forms of expression in PI 
§1 above, the Investigations appear at least quite capable of fulfilling the first of these two 
requirements, viz. reaching those (and only those) who do have business with a particular 
problem or question. In the following, then, I want to also briefly discuss an instance of the 
Investigations fulfilling the second requirement, viz. the book’s coming ‘to its own support’. 
When it is first introduced in Philosophical Investigations, the primary function of 
Wittgenstein’s prominent chess analogy could be said to consist in helping to bring out the 
systematic character of language, the importance of the intra-linguistic (roughly, comprising the 
subject of the discipline of linguistics) entirety as the context of a meaningful word, i.e. that 
which has to already be in place in order for an explanation of the meaning of a word to be 
intelligible (see e.g. PI §31).
96
 Here the analogy is a means to dispel the temptation to think of 
linguistic meaning as essentially composed of the meanings of words which in turn are thought 
of as ‘what the word stands for’ (as though every word that comes out of our mouths were 
somehow, invisibly but rigidly, attached to one definite object in the world, or as though our 
language were constituted by an infinite multitude of implicit acts of tagging names to objects). 
In the course of the subsequent sections, further elements are added to the analogy, e.g. the 
importance of the extra-linguistic context, the surrounding circumstances and related actions 
(see PI §33). Ultimately, the analogy connects (more or less explicitly) with such notions as 
‘language-game’ and ‘rule-following’. It is in this connection that the analogy between chess 
and language turns out to be potentially problematic. For as much as the analogy with chess can 
help one to rid oneself of those confusions that arise when one is in the grip of a reference-
theoretical picture of the functioning of language, this very same analogy can easily make it 
seem to one as though language were, ‘like chess’, an activity of infinitely many possibilities 
while at the same time being rigidly rule-governed, very much like an axiomatic mathematical 
calculus. Arguably, this latter comparison results in a conception of language which 
Wittgenstein thought was terribly misguided, and many of his remarks in the Investigations are 
designed to combat this conception. Hence, someone who is inclined to take the chess analogy 
too far in this way (viz. ‘attacks the text unfairly’) will find that the text actually contains an 
appropriate response to their misunderstanding. (And the way such potential confusions that 
stem, for example, from the chess analogy get cleared up does not consist in explicit discussion, 
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 In connection with the following discussion see also my discussion of §§43 and 138 in Section 2, 
above. 
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but is finely woven into the surrounding structure of analogies, pictures, metaphors and related 
discussions and dialogues, and of the following, foregoing and otherwise related remarks, so 
subtle indeed that only one who has reason to look close enough might see it.
97
) 
In analogies such as the one with chess, Wittgenstein found forms of expression which do 
not pretend to say everything at once and which therefore can (only) be understood gradually, 
better and better, step by step. It is by way of building complex structures with and around these 
analogies, for instance, that Wittgenstein appears to have found a way of crafting a text that 
once let go can come to its own support when ‘attacked unfairly’. And thus, in these respects, as 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it appears that Wittgenstein can be said to have faced up 
to the challenge of writing Socratic philosophy, and that he has turned himself, successfully, 
into a speaking mirror. 
In order to avoid the false impression that this was such an easy thing to do, here is a short, 
incomplete, unordered and unsystematic list of techniques by which Wittgenstein can be said to 
have achieved his ‘feat of writing’: 
a. Dialogical passages. One important feature, which was not remarked upon as such 
earlier, is that the balance between Wittgenstein’s voices is much more equal than in, 
for example, Plato’s dialogues. Hence, again, there is no easy way to identify an 
authority in Wittgenstein’s dialogical passages like Plato’s Socrates, for instance. 
b. Hermetic dialogues. There are no assigned names and no other consistently employed 
markers of voice identity (e.g. no consistent use of quotation marks, no use of recurring 
linguistic registers). As noted above, in general there are no obvious boundaries be-
tween different voices. It is equally difficult on any close study of the text to identify 
consistent voices that would frequently reappear. 
c. Introductory phrases. e.g. ‘I want to say…’, ‘I am tempted to say…’ or ‘One is inclined 
to say…’. Such expressions of personal commitment or expression of criteria are in-
tended to provoke a reaction from readers. 
d. Concealed problems. Sometimes, readers complain about that it can be difficult to even 
understand what the problem is in many sections of the Investigations. As has been 
argued above, this is because it was not Wittgenstein’s intention to teach us philosophi-
cal problems but only to help solve (or dissolve) them in the case that someone has a 
particular problem. Or as Cavell puts it: ‘his writing . . . wishes to prevent 
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 For instance, if one reads carefully enough, one can actually see that Wittgenstein already cautions 
against the danger of the related analogy with rules and rule-following when first introducing the chess 
analogy (‘However, one can also imagine someone’s having learnt the game without ever learning or 
formulating rules’ (PI §31)). Most people, however, do not notice his cautioning here, or do not think it 
significant. (But would Wittgenstein therefore have done better to put up a larger warning sign in this 
place? It seems to me that this could only have failed in its purpose.) 
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understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change’ (Cavell 1962, [72]). On the 
other hand, it is of course true that almost no reader fails to ‘find’ their problem 
eventually.
98
 
e. Open questions. e.g. ‘The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. 
(Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)’ (§122).99 
f. Missing explanations. e.g. ‘If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would 
never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them’ (§128). 
g. Interspersed psychological observations on philosophising. e.g. ‘Indeed, when we look 
into ourselves as we do philosophy, we often get to see just such a picture. Virtually a 
pictorial representation of our grammar. Not facts; but, as it were, illustrated turns of 
speech’ (§295). 
h. Metaphors. e.g. language as ‘an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old 
and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded 
by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses’ 
(§18). 
i. Comparisons. e.g. ‘The sentence “Sensations are private” is comparable to “One plays 
patience by oneself”’ (§248). 
j. Analogies. e.g. between games and language (§7) or, specifically, chess and language 
(§31; §108). 
k. Nested analogies. e.g. between meaning and use (§§1, 43, 138), or between speaking a 
language and following rules (§§185 ff.).
100
 
l. Ambiguous judgements (e.g. §§1, 2, 32), ambiguous definitions (e.g. §7), and 
ambiguous imperatives (e.g. §2). 
m. Punctuation. Wittgenstein’s punctuation can sometimes seem all over the place. But 
there is a reason to assume that he knew exactly what he was doing (cf. ‘Really I want 
to slow down the speed of reading with continual (my copious) punctuation marks. For 
I should like to be read slowly. (As I myself read.)’ (CV 77e)). 
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 Somewhat paradoxically, in order to write in a way such that one’s readers never get the feeling that 
they actually understand the author (already), one therefore occasionally has to write in such a way that 
one’s readers do not understand. In this connection, cf. also the discussion of Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
Kierkegaard and the Bible above. 
99
 See also my discussion of §280 and §295 in Section 4.1 below. 
100
 It is Saul Kripke’s most fundamental mistake not to have understood the limits of Wittgenstein’s 
analogical thinking between linguistic activities and the following of rules. 
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n. ‘Criss-crossing’. Not only does reading the Investigations linearly feel like being led 
‘criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought’ (PI, Preface)101, but the fact 
that one is thus being led, together with the formal ordering of ‘all these thoughts as 
remarks, short paragraphs, sometimes in longer chains about the same subject, 
sometimes jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to another’ (PI, Preface), moti-
vates us to read in a non-linear way, hence jumping between remarks according to our 
own orientation. Thus we are made to jump from one section to another section, e.g. 
from §138 to §43, to §1, to §117 and so on,
102
 as soon as we have gotten to know the 
landscape fairly well (after, say, one or two linear readings).
103
 
o. (Apparent) textual contradiction. e.g. between §§258, 289, 290, as discussed in Section 
4.1 below; or, again, between §1 and §43. 
p. Language-games. By using the method of constructing language-games as objects of 
comparison (or centres of variation), Wittgenstein manages, for example, to massively 
reduce the dogmatic force by which he ‘imposes’ onto the reader his own opinion about 
‘ordinary language’. In Section 3, above, I briefly discussed how this method resembles 
the Socratic technique of ‘definitions’, in that both are used, undogmatically, in order to 
formulate a rigorous ground on which interlocutors can agree in order to, then, proceed 
in their joint search and see whether they might not agree on the larger, ‘deeper’ ques-
tions that their search is primarily directed at.
104
 (Cf. also next item on the list.) 
q. ‘Examples’ (as in §133, the teaching ‘by examples’). Wittgenstein imposes on us a 
certain particular form of example, namely the kind of examples whose series ‘can be 
broken off’ (§133).105 In this respect, they resemble Plato’s dialogues, insofar as we saw 
that the latter as a whole can also function like examples that are meant to instruct us on 
how to continue a certain kind of activity (as opposed to the kind of example that 
Descartes’ Meditations might be said to intend to be, which only seems to allow for its 
imitation). – The German word, ‘Beispiel’, does not have a literal equivalent in the Eng-
lish language. But in a way, what Wittgenstein does is like understanding it as ‘Bei-
Spiel’, viz. ‘something which is played around/close to (something or somebody else)’; 
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 See also (Diamond 2004) and (Pichler manuscript). 
102
 See also my discussion of these remarks in Section 2, above. 
103
 Wittgenstein once actually planned to insert references for such ‘criss-crossing’ into every remark, 
viz. indicating the section numbers of other, related remarks in the book next to the section number of 
each remark. Perhaps he did not do so in order not to impose his own way of seeing connections onto the 
reader too strongly. (However, just a few references of this sort might have helped a number of additional 
readers to get into the groove of criss-cross reading.) 
104
 See (Kuusela forthcoming) for an exemplary discussion of both similarities and dissimilarities 
between this method of later Wittgenstein’s and those of early, as well as contemporary, analytic 
philosophy. 
105
 On Wittgenstein’s special use of examples see also (Hertzberg 2006). 
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something which goes side by side with something else, as though playfully seducing 
but never actually touching it. 
——— However philosophically sophisticated Wittgenstein’s writing techniques might have 
been, many people have taken what they tend to describe as his ‘style’ in Philosophical 
Investigations as obscure or at the very least unnecessarily enigmatic. Ernest Gellner, for 
example, as is well-known, took no great liking to this sort of writing; and he complained: ‘it 
was very hard to tell from that collection of Delphic utterances what the devil Wittgenstein was 
trying to say’ (1974, 20). Bertrand Russell could not help thinking that Wittgenstein had ‘given 
up serious philosophy’. And arguably the majority of attempts—especially written ones (and 
perhaps also the present essay)—to ‘explain’ Wittgenstein’s text always seem to me to carry at 
least a light smell of betrayal. Now, in this essay, I have tried inter alia to present a picture such 
that, if we follow it, one reason behind the peculiar-looking composition of the text of 
Philosophical Investigations may become more understandable. I have argued, for instance, that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach shares an important feature with that of Socrates, viz. 
that it is best practised in direct personal conversation. Both these philosophers believed that 
real philosophical understanding is not something which could be written down in the form of a 
(doctrinal) book, if it could be written (about) in any useful way at all. Similarly, according to 
this approach, what someone’s problem is cannot be sufficiently specified by a phrase like ‘the 
problem of other minds’ or even by a lengthy argument for ‘its’ conclusion, and hence neither 
can its solution – or for that matter ‘objective’ philosophical understanding – be ‘mass-
produced’. Rather, it has to be tailor-made to the specific needs, issues, confusions, ways of 
thinking and modes of understanding of the respective individual who is asking a particular 
philosophical question in each particular case. All this, as I have tried to show, is fundamentally 
related to the role which is played by the philosophical understanding of (one) another in the 
more general kind of philosophical understanding. Socrates, it appears, as a consequence, 
decided to conduct his philosophical teaching exclusively in the form of direct personal 
conversations. Wittgenstein, however, worked on the preparation of his book for publication for 
more than ten years (even though he did not publish it himself in the end). During these many 
years, he developed writing techniques such as the ones mentioned in this section which 
allowed him to remain true, as far as he could, to the Socratic ideal of philosophy. As such, 
Wittgenstein’s book is unique. And even though we are surely still a long way from really 
grasping the uniqueness of it, or even catching a glimpse, I believe I have reached a moment 
here (or I once reached such a moment) where I could name one phenomenon which partakes in 
the book’s uniqueness and which the book might be said to be the first and only materialisation 
of. What I mean is expressed in the fact that the book actively enables different individuals (or, 
equally: the same individual at different times) to have different conversations with the text in 
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accordance with their specific philosophical concerns, interests and modes of understanding, 
almost like one particular Socratic dialogue for each individual reader at each particular time.
106
 
This is also another reason why it is so difficult to write about this book. It seems to me, 
however, that I am young and inexperienced enough to make one more attempt, in the subse-
quent and final section of this essay. 
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 The overall technique of the book’s composition could therefore perhaps be called ‘multi-
conversational writing’. 
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4.1 Private language games, PI §§243 ff. 
One particular section from the famous stretch of remarks starting from Section 243 in 
Philosophical Investigations, nowadays still commonly referred to as ‘the private language 
argument (or, arguments)’, reads as follows: 
299. Being unable – when we indulge in philosophical thought – to help saying 
something or other, being irresistibly inclined to say it, does not mean being forced into 
an assumption, or having an immediate insight into, or knowledge of, a state of affairs. 
(PI §299) 
This remark relates in two important ways to what I shall have to say in this section of the 
present essay.
107
 First, it indicates that Wittgenstein did not take the expression of a philosophi-
cal idea to always be either true or false, or else strictly nonsensical. Rather, as illustrated by this 
passage, he was aware of the possibility that the meaning of what is being said might also 
simply be unclear, both in the sense that the hearer might not understand what has been said, as 
well as in the sense that the speaker who utters the words might not be clear about what exactly 
they mean either. (Again, I think that, phenomenologically speaking, this is probably an 
experience from doing philosophy which most of us will know only too well. It takes some time 
to work out an idea in all its clarity, and sometimes what at first seemed to be a promising line 
of thought turns out to be not so great after all.) Secondly, the quotation reminds us that, as has 
been stressed repeatedly in this essay, when reading Wittgenstein, we need to be on our guard as 
to who is speaking; and to ask ourselves, among other things: who could possibly want to say 
such a thing? Could I want to say such a thing? What is it that Wittgenstein might be trying to 
convey through this particular composition of differing voices? 
In the context of the larger aims of the present essay, my purpose with this section is also 
twofold. Corresponding to the first of the above points, I want to demonstrate some of the 
characteristics that the passages in question share with the Socratic method as described in 
Section 1 above. For example, it seems crucial to me that Wittgenstein repeatedly ‘asks’ the 
interlocutor who gives expression to the idea of a putatively ‘private language’, ‘what do you 
mean?’, thus allowing the different possible senses that different individuals might be inclined 
(to try) to give to these words to be developed in more detail, thus increasing the potential for 
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 Cf. also the following remark from within the range of remarks about the idea of a private language 
in the Investigations: ‘What we are “tempted to say” in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is 
its raw material’ (§254). Wittgenstein does not mean this to be the ‘raw material’ for constructive 
theorising but it is primarily ‘something for philosophical treatment’ (§254), as he goes on to characterise 
it – ‘The philosopher treats a question; like an illness’ (§255). 
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mutual understanding and, as a consequence, the potential for more comprehensive clarity on 
the part of the enquiring subjects as to the nature of the object under consideration.
108
 
Then, corresponding to the second of the above points, I shall also try to indicate how the 
passages in question do not, unlike Plato’s dialogues, just report one possible Socratic dialogue 
about the questions involved, but indeed manage to offer a structure which allows different 
readers to have different possible dialogues of this kind with the text; as it were, different 
conversations each time they encounter the text. I am aware that to demonstrate this feature of 
the text with sufficient clarity is not at all an easy thing to do.
109
 For the present attempt, I have 
chosen to start from a discussion of Severin Schroeder’s exposition in his book Wittgenstein. 
The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle (2006), which in many ways can be regarded as a fairly standard 
account in the scholarly literature and also, it seems to me, as a good representation of the ways 
in which many contemporary readers might be inclined to read the text.
110
 I shall try to show 
how Schroeder’s reading, although in itself a coherent and well-argued possible understanding 
of the text, ultimately fails as an interpretation of the text in that it fails to acknowledge the 
multitude of possible individual readings that can be had on the same level as the one Schroeder 
promotes as the reading.
111
 To this end, I shall try to point out at least one alternative reading to 
each of Schroeder’s interpretations of particular passages that I discuss. 
In general, we can distinguish two tendencies, either of which commentators’ exegetical 
accounts usually approximate in their attitude towards the idea of a ‘private language’. On the 
one hand, there is the tendency to see Wittgenstein as arguing for the falsity of the idea of a 
‘private language’. On the other hand, there is the tendency to see him as arguing that its 
expression is ultimately nonsense.
112
 In other words, while the former interpretative tendency 
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 In this connection, cf. also the following observation by Mark Rowe: ‘the dialogic form of the 
Investigations, unlike the straightforward dialogue form of most of Plato’s work, means that it can 
suggest not only a conversation between one person and another, but one person talking to himself, and 
trying, not to present a conclusion, but to thrash out a difficulty’ (Rowe 2013, 116). 
109
 The difficulty of writing about texts like the Investigations (or, similarly, Either, Or (1843)) has 
been brought out rather brilliantly by James Conant in his (1989). 
110
 Cf.: ‘Anglophone philosophers have tended to see the so-called private language argument . . . as a 
courtroom trial, or even as a battle. On one side we find a whole crowd of great philosophers: the king 
amongst them is Descartes, but his army comprises Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Russell, James, Schlick, etc. 
On the other side Wittgenstein himself stands all by himself, like David against the Philistines. And 
unassisted, they suppose, he wins the battle . . . refuting all forms of dualism, solipsism and idealism’ 
(Baker 1990, [110]). 
111
 It should be noted that I do not strictly reject any of the readings that I critically engage with. 
Although my proposed reading ultimately introduces certain aspects the usefulness or correctness of 
which others may want to disagree with, I see myself essentially as offering something of a conciliatory 
account under which a great many apparent disagreements in the existing literature could be resolved (on 
the possibility of such a reconciliation, cf. also (Stern 2011, 345). 
112
 As we shall see, these tendencies might not be restricted to ‘commentators’. Notably, they turn up 
quite explicitly in Section 246, for instance (cf. also my discussion below). 
Stewart Candlish (2012, 7–10) employs a similar distinction. His use of the distinction is prone to 
oversimplification, however, since he categorises particular readings as belonging to either of the two 
sides, which does not hold true of any cases that I can think of. – In the present essay, the distinction is 
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consists in ascribing one determinate sense to the idea of a private language and subsequently 
argues that it is a false hypothesis, the latter interpretative tendency consists in arguing that 
there is no possible sense that could be given to the idea in the first place. 
Following the spirit of Wittgenstein’s (and Socrates’) practice of philosophising, I believe 
that we do best not to give way to either of these two tendencies when commentating on the text 
(as opposed to ‘simply’ reading it). Therefore, instead of taking it that the idea of a private 
language must either simply have a sense or not, I am going to argue that the idea of a private 
language is first and foremost unclear in its supposed sense as it is first introduced in PI §243, 
and that Wittgenstein’s subsequent discussion is thus directed at the multitude of possible senses 
rather than at the truth or falsity, or mere nonsensicality, of (what would appear to be) only one 
possible ‘sense’  that we could try to give to it. 
Schroeder sees Wittgenstein as presenting six major arguments against the idea of a private 
language. I agree with Schroeder insofar as, in principle, these arguments (or, at least most of 
them) are there to be found in the text (if one is so inclined to look for them). But I think that, in 
any case, their force is different from the way Schroeder presents them. According to Schroeder, 
Wittgenstein’s sole concern is with what Schroeder calls ‘the inner-object model: the view that 
psychological terms stand for objects, or states or occurrences, in a person’s mind’ (Schroeder 
2006, 201–2) and Wittgenstein’s ‘procedure in §§243–315 is to develop the consequences of 
that view with respect to words for bodily sensations and feelings, and then to show how those 
consequences lead to absurdity or contradiction’ (Schroeder 2006, 202). I believe that this is far 
from all that Wittgenstein is concerned with in these sections. Again, on my understanding 
Wittgenstein does not take it for granted that it is even clear what the talk of a private language 
is supposed to mean. Rather, in Section 243 Wittgenstein introduces the idea as the ‘the raw 
material’ of his subsequent attempts to see what could possibly be meant by someone who is 
tempted to express themselves in such a way. Hence, the six arguments, as extracted by 
Schroeder, can, at most, be said to form part of Wittgenstein’s attempt to clarify the meaning of 
the expressions involved. But in this sense, Wittgenstein is really only exhibiting rather than 
asserting these arguments, like objects of comparison (different language-games).
113
 Neither are 
the arguments ‘obligatory’. Insofar as they can be extracted, they do not need to be (that is, not 
by every single reader; one can have an illuminating conversation with the text without 
                                                                                                                                                           
not intended to represent any actual readings. Its primary purpose is to serve as a model for developing 
the outlines of my own reading in this section. 
113
 In this sense the function of these arguments is similar to the argument which precedes §43, as 
discussed in Section 2 above. Furthermore, just as Wittgenstein’s discussion of the language-game of the 
builders in §2 ff. does not lead to the abandonment of the idea that ‘the meaning of a word is the object 
for which the word stands’—but only to its clarification—the discussion of the private language game 
does not lead to an abandonment of the idea of a private language, but only to its clarification. 
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specifically attending to such argumentative structures), and there are many more devices of 
philosophical communication in the text than just ‘arguments’.114 
Before looking at Schroeder’s six arguments one by one, it will be helpful to briefly quote 
the famous words with which Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a private language in Section 
243: 
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or 
give voice to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and so on – for his own use? —
– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The 
words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate 
private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (PI §243) 
It is worth noting that the introduction is performed in the form of a question as to whether we 
could imagine something, and that the possible meaning of that which we are asked to try to 
imagine might perhaps not be so easily grasped. We are thus being alerted to issues concerning 
mutual understanding in the relevant sections right from the start. Readers are being reminded 
that they should not take themselves to already understand even what the question here is. The 
voice introducing the idea responds to a first request for clarification by saying, ‘But that is not 
what I mean’ and makes one more attempt to specify what it is that they mean. But would it be 
wise to take ourselves to already understand what that person might mean?
115
 — In the follow-
ing I shall briefly expound each of Schroeder’s six arguments, one after another, and also 
indicate in each case my reasons for thinking that, pace Schroeder, none of them show a 
supposedly definite idea of a private language to be false or its expression to be nonsensical. 
1. The ascribability argument. According to Schroeder, Wittgenstein argues for the conclu-
sion that ‘introspection can never teach me how to ascribe a sensation to a particular person’ 
(Schroeder 2006, 205). Schroeder takes this argument to be developed in Section 302, where 
Wittgenstein writes at the start: 
If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too 
easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I don’t feel on the model of pain 
which I do feel. (PI §302) 
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 Traditional arguments might even seem to be the least important of these devices. This has been 
remarked upon by quite a few commentators, e.g. Ray Monk: ‘most of the section that is . . . 
conventionally regarded as the “Private Language Argument” does not seem to centre on an argument at 
all; rather, it seems to be a mixed bag of bald assertions, metaphors, wry jokes and exercises of the 
imagination’ (Monk 2005, 88). However, as I said above, Schroeder’s reading, including his tendency to 
extract arguments, appears to me, not merely possible, but to be representative for much of the general 
readership of today and (partly) therefore worth considering. 
115
 In this context, it may also be of interest to note that after writing that ‘The philosopher treats a 
question; like an illness’ (PI §255), Wittgenstein in fact continues by asking a question, namely: ‘Now, 
what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?’ 
(PI §256). Wittgenstein thus proposes to treat this question as a possible symptom of a philosophical 
perplexity. To this extent, it constitutes the ‘raw material’ of his subsequent philosophical enquiries. What 
one might make of it (or: mean by it) is entirely open at this stage. 
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Schroeder argues that ‘the supposition that someone else might have what I, through 
introspection, defined as “pain” amounts to a contradiction in terms’ (2006, 205). That’s why, 
Schroeder implies, the idea of a private language leads to the result that the ascription of a 
sensation to another person would be impossible, and, hence, the hypothesis of a private 
language false. However, reading the paragraph Schroeder is referring to, I simply cannot find 
such a strong argument being expressed (nor can I find one anywhere in its vicinity). But, 
perhaps more importantly, it seems clear that, although potentially sound, someone convinced 
of the truth of some notion of a private language might not be convinced at all by this argument. 
For, they might think that the argument merely re-asserts their supposed scepticism about other 
minds. Thus, for one person this argument might seem to be a strong reductio ad absurdum of 
what they had in mind when considering the possibility of a private language. However, 
someone else might simply want to bite this bullet; yet another person might think that this 
whole argument rests on a misunderstanding of what they wanted to say when they first tried to 
express their idea; etc. 
When put into context, the question Section 302 might put to someone could perhaps be 
paraphrased in the following way: ‘If you mean that you could define a word for a sensation by 
focussing your introspective attention on it when it occurs, so that you could establish what 
counts as a correct use of the word for yourself without anyone else being able to understand it 
– given that this was actually possible – then would you further want to claim that this was how 
we actually acquired such words? For I could not see how, in such a case, one could possibly 
ascribe sensations to others.’ Thus we see that Section 302 is a way of posing one question in 
one possible dialogue that can be had by someone with the text, viz. whether that someone 
(really) means to hold such a view—this question is hence neither polemical nor merely 
rhetorical, but an honest attempt to understand what is meant. The decision as to whether it is a 
tenable view that ‘one knows of someone else’s pain only on the model of one’s own’ is left 
entirely to the respective interlocutor (reader).
116
 The force of any insinuated argument is thus 
left largely undefined by Wittgenstein. 
2. The idle-wheel argument. Schroeder essentially derives this argument from the well-
known beetle analogy in Section 293. There Wittgenstein asks us to imagine (as with §243, in 
this respect) the following scenario: 
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 Cf. also the following passage from Baker about later Wittgenstein’s method, which can now also 
be understood as pointing out the problem of writing Socratic philosophy in the special case of later 
Wittgenstein (although this is unacknowledged by Baker): ‘. . . individual treatment to individuals’ 
particular ‘problems’. It is radically individualistic because it demands the active participation of the 
‘patient’ in a discussion. He must explain what he wants to say, how he wants to define expressions; he 
must acknowledge the pictures that influence him; he is invited to adopt novel ways of ordering things; 
and so on. Consequently, this procedure is essentially dialectical. It constantly demands that the 
interlocutor make decisions’ (Baker 1999, [181]). 
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Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one 
can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only 
by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something 
different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. (PI §293) 
As to the question, ‘But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless?’ (§293), 
Wittgenstein then presents us with the following answer: 
If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the 
language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. – No, 
one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (PI 
§293)
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Schroeder sees Wittgenstein here as stating the following two conclusions: 
C1 The identity of such private experience is immaterial to our public talk about pain. 
C2 The meaning of the word ‘pain’ is not determined by the identity of a private 
experience. In short: pain is not a private experience. (Schroeder 2006, 208) 
Now, while I want to agree with C1, I believe that C2 is too strong a conclusion to ascribe to 
Wittgenstein. As to C1: surely, by virtue of being an element of a constructed language-game 
alone, the beetle in the box—or, analogously: a private experience of this kind—does not affect 
our public talk about pain. However, regarding C2, Wittgenstein does not draw the conclusion 
that, hence, pain was not a private experience. In this case, moreover, it even seems doubtful to 
me whether Wittgenstein actually exhibits an argument to such a conclusion. 
In this connection, it is crucial to note the set-up of the language-game in Section 293. It is 
one construed strictly in terms of names and reference. A wider notion of meaning is excluded 
from it.
118
 Wittgenstein also formulates a conclusion in analogy: 
That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 
‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI §293) 
 Therefore, insofar as ‘the meaning of the word “pain”’ is not concerned in any direct way such 
as Schroeder seems to presuppose, C2 can be seen not to play a role in the general argumenta-
tive structure of the beetle analogy at all (that is, quite regardless of whether Wittgenstein 
asserts or merely indirectly puts forward such an argument for consideration). 
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 Note that, when read as an analysis of the analogy (rather than an extension of its exposition), this 
answer is not particularly moderate and hence not as conclusive as it might appear. For, when assessing 
the analogy, we are free to imagine different possible scenarios, including the one in which it so happens 
that everyone has the same sort of thing in their box. Clearly, then, in such a case, depending on what 
exactly it is that everyone has in their box, this would have at least certain psychological consequences 
for what people say and do in relation to these boxes. This is to say: the thing in the box would not 
‘cancel out, whatever it is’, or at least not in all respects. 
118
 Peter Hacker notes this too: ‘The example of the beetle in the private box is invoked to show that if 
one construes the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of name and object (e.g. “beetle” 
and the insect named), then the “object” would drop out of consideration as irrelevant to the shared 
language-game’ (Hacker 1990, 9). Cf. also (Hacker 1990, 111–112). 
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With regard to the two above-mentioned interpretative tendencies, it can be seen that 
Wittgenstein does not argue for the falsity of an allegedly determinate idea of a private language 
(‘pain being a private experience’), but rather attempts to clarify what could possibly be meant 
by someone who is tempted to say something of this sort. This can become clear, for example, 
from the fact that in Section 295 Wittgenstein describes ways in which good sense can indeed 
be made of the idea of a private reference, as alluded to in Section 293. In Section 295, he writes: 
So this is what I imagine: everyone says of himself that he knows what pain is only from 
his own pain. – Not that people really say that, or are even prepared to say it. But if 
everybody said it —– it might be a kind of exclamation. And even if it gives no 
information, still, it is a picture; and why should we not want to call such a picture before 
our mind? Imagine an allegorical painting instead of the words. (PI §295)
119
 
From this it should, moreover, be clear that Wittgenstein is also not dismissing the expression of 
the idea of a private language as mere nonsense in these sections. On the contrary, he again 
exhibits the serious intention to be, in principle, charitable to someone who expresses an idea of 
a ‘private language’. 
3. Knowledge of other minds. Here is another well-known remark. I think in this case it will 
be useful to insert generic speaker names, following (or, trying to follow) the same pattern as in 
Section 2 above: 
246. [Moderator/Hans:] In what sense are my sensations private? – [Franz:] Well, only I 
can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – [Hans:] In 
one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word ‘know’ as it is 
normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m 
in pain. [(false)] – [Franz:] Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I 
know it myself! – [Hans:] It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I 
know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain? 
[(nonsense)] (PI §246) 
Schroeder takes up both of these lines of argument. First, he argues that, in the sense in which 
the scepticism supposedly expressed about other minds relies on nonsense, ‘the attempt to argue 
that the first-person case provides a better standard of knowledge fails, for it isn’t a case of 
knowledge at all’ (Schroeder 2006: 209). Schroeder adds: ‘Thus scepticism about other minds is 
stopped in its tracks’ (Schroeder 2006: 209). 
Secondly, in the sense in which the scepticism supposedly expressed about other minds is 
said to be false, Schroeder argues that Wittgenstein has actually shown it to be inconsistent. 
Here, Schroeder reminds us of Section 244, where he sees Wittgenstein as stating ‘a conceptual 
link between pain, for example, and certain forms of expressive behaviour’ (Schroeder 2006, 
209). But, despite the fact that, knowing his manuscripts, it seems safe to say that Wittgenstein 
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 Such a ‘kind of exclamation’ could for instance be intended to mean that (in most cases) one only 
fully understands what a certain heavy pain is if one has had this sort of pain oneself. Certainly, this need 
not therefore be true. Alternatively, the biblical story of Job could also be referenced or remembered in 
such a way. 
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(himself) indeed thought that there was such a conceptual link, in Section 244 he explicitly 
qualifies his words by saying ‘Here is one possibility: . . .’ (§244).120 He writes: 
How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the 
word “pain”. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, 
expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; 
then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the 
child new pain-behaviour. (PI §244) 
Wittgenstein does not argue here for ‘a conceptual link’ which would make it inconsistent to say 
‘we only know about our own pains (or, sensations)’. — As to the first part of the argument (but 
also in another response to the second of Schroeder’s conclusions): there is a hint in Section 246 
indicating that what is meant by the interlocutor might in fact not strictly adhere to ‘the word 
“know” as it is normally used’ (§246). But, while in Section 246 Wittgenstein solely presents us 
with an exclamation of irritation (‘and how else are we to use it?’ (§246)), it is only one remark 
further down that this question actually gets answered by an example from analogy. In Section 
247, Wittgenstein namely writes: 
247. “Only you can know if you had that intention.” One might tell someone this when 
explaining the meaning of the word “intention” to him. For then it means: that is how we 
use it. 
(And here “know” means that the expression of uncertainty is senseless.) (PI §247)121 
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 Schroeder, in a footnote, writes: ‘Wittgenstein calls this “one possibility”. What other possibility is 
there? We could also learn what pain is without ever feeling pain ourselves, by being shown someone 
who is visibly in pain’ (Schroeder 2006, 213, n.35). This is, in one sense, correct. But some may find this 
to beg the question against certain popular theories of ‘phenomenal concepts’. However, arguably, 
Wittgenstein would not have non-discriminately rejected just any notion of phenomenal concepts, as 
William Child argues persuasively in (Child 2015). Furthermore, Wittgenstein did consider it also 
conceivable, and hence possible, that someone could be born with our actual language (English, in this 
case) (see BlB). 
Moreover, it should not be surprising that the first few remarks introducing the (unclear) idea of a 
private language (§§243–246, say) are somewhat more dogmatic. In this respect, they can be regarded as 
providing a preliminary demarcation of the terrain to be covered in its extremes. 
On the ‘sketching of possibilities’ and §244, see also the following passage by Baker: ‘[Wittgenstein] 
has no intention of establishing facts of grammar (e.g., that “pain” is not the name of an object) or 
outlining psychological facts (e.g., that a child learns the meaning of the word “pain” through replacing 
the natural expression of pain by the emission of articulate sounds). Rather he adumbrates possibilities’ 
(G. Baker 1992, [128]). (Cf. also Baker 1990, [116].) 
121
 Cf. also §248. In §§246 and 295 Wittgenstein, in addition to teaching, gives further examples of 
how to use such an expression with perfectly good sense (and without it leading to scepticism about other 
minds), namely, as a joke or as an allegorical picture. 
Stephen Mulhall, with whose interpretation I otherwise broadly agree, seems to equally overlook this 
important connection when he writes that ‘several turns of phrase in his first paragraph [of §246] speak 
against the thought that Wittgenstein is either plainly aware of those alternative, non-epistemic uses of “I 
know”, or concerned to open up the possibility that something real and important lies behind the 
interlocutor’s misbegotten ways of articulating his conception of privacy—namely, his sarcastic rather 
than inviting uses of the questions “how else are we to use it?” and “What is it supposed to mean?”’ 
(Mulhall 2007, 51). It must be noted, however, that Mulhall tries to rescue his Wittgenstein—he writes: 
‘For it is the interlocutor who directs our attention to the specific example of pain in his initial response to 
Wittgenstein’s opening question, . . . If, then, we regard it as central to Wittgenstein’s later conception of 
philosophy that he adopt a purely responsive role in his dialogues with his interlocutors . . . , then we 
might read his remarks in this paragraph as wholly negative in intent. The interpretative proposal here is 
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Again, it becomes clear that Wittgenstein neither dismisses an allegedly clear expression of an 
idea of a private language as false nor does he outright dismiss all such attempts as mere 
nonsense. Instead, Wittgenstein takes the urge, the temptation to express something-like-an-
idea-of-a-private-language very seriously. It is the raw material of his philosophical activity. 
Schroeder, however, is of course not far off the mark at all. Most of the possible senses that one 
might want to give to the idea of a private language explored by Wittgenstein will indeed strike 
us as absurd or fantastic, while others strike us as trivial or uninteresting. Schroeder’s reading is 
one possible reading – and a strong and therefore important one too. It is namely the reading of 
someone to whom Hans’ ‘arguments’ speak, whose idea of a ‘private language’ is for instance 
such that what Wittgenstein has Hans say in Section 246 would not be a misunderstanding of it. 
However, as an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s text, Schroeder’s reading is therefore rather one-
sided. For, as I am arguing, there is more than one such possible reading here. In fact, it would 
seem fair to say, there are at least as many as there are possible ideas of what a ‘private 
language’ might be following its initial introduction in Section 243. 
4. The no-criterion argument. This is essentially the argument that is often said to prove the 
impossibility of private ostensive definition.
122
 The paradigm case drawn on by commentators is 
the ‘private sensation diary’ in Section 258, where the idea of making use of a private sign is 
expressed in the following way: 
I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it 
with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the 
sensation. (PI §258) 
Wittgenstein asks how this sign is being given a meaning, and the answer he goes on to consider 
is this: 
by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection 
between the sign and the sensation. (PI §258) 
Schroeder then calls the way this view gets criticised in what follows in Section 258 the ‘no-
criterion argument’: 
But ‘I commit it to memory’ can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember 
the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of 
                                                                                                                                                           
as follows: if the feeling we are concerned with is pain, and if by ‘knowing’ we mean certainty, then what 
the interlocutor is saying about knowing his own pain stands in need of a variety of decisive corrections. 
There may be other feelings and states of mind to consider, and other ways of using “I know” in the first 
person to canvass; but these are irrelevant to the particular interlocutory dialogue presently under way, 
and may anyway be better grasped when the assumptions behind this exchange are entirely uprooted’ 
(2007, 52)—but this manoeuvre of Mulhall leaves a somewhat sour taste in one’s mouth (or, more 
precisely perhaps, in Wittgenstein’s). For, Mulhall does not sufficiently explain what he is still tempted to 
call ‘the brusqueness and banked fire of Wittgenstein’s responses’ (2007, 53). But if we let go of the idea 
that it is always ‘Wittgenstein and his interlocutor’ who are speaking in the dialogues of the 
Investigations, then this whole problem disappears. 
122
 For instance in (Hacker 1990). 
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correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. 
And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’. (PI §258) 
Schroeder concludes, ‘the attempt to construe the sign “S” as the name of objective mental 
occurrences fails’ (Schroeder 2006, 212). And Schroeder is right to call this ‘a powerful 
argument’ (2006, 213). He might, furthermore, be correct in saying that this argument is 
‘directed at the very core of the inner-object picture’ (2006, 213). But notably, this would again 
mean that it was directed against only one possible sense that someone might want to give to the, 
in itself primarily vague, idea of a private language and that, therefore, the argument is not as 
conclusive as Schroeder makes it appear. 
As Schroeder points out, part of the argument’s persuasive force is that it would seem absurd 
to us that one could be constantly (and systematically) mistaken about one’s own sensations, as 
seems entailed by the particular proposal of a procedure of definition in Section 258. This has to 
do with the trivial fact that we normally do not have to identify our sensations at all, but their 
linguistic expressions often enough just come to us naturally, almost like a reflex. This reminder 
is repeated pointedly by Wittgenstein, much in line with many of his earlier remarks on rule-
following,
123
 in Section 290: 
It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of criteria; it is, rather, that I use 
the same expression. (PI §290) 
But does this not now contradict Schroeder’s argument from Section 258?—I think, on the 
purely textual level, the answer has to be: Yes.
124
 Hence, it would, again, seem wrong to ascribe 
too much force to any argument we might want to extract from Section 258—at least, wrong to 
put ‘too much force’ into Wittgenstein’s mouth. The definition of a private symbol through 
‘concentration of one’s attention in introspection’ is not the only way in which one might try to 
make sense of the idea of a private language (this also goes back to Schroeder’s ‘ascribability 
argument’ above). And thus we should not think that Wittgenstein was committed to such a 
view.
125
 On the other hand, if we see the passages that are associated with what Schroeder calls 
the ‘no-criterion argument’ as constituting more than just one thing which someone might want 
to say in the course of a particular conversation concerning one possible way in which someone 
(else) might try to give sense to an idea of a private language, then we are in a position to 
appreciate the argument’s limited application, appropriately. For someone whose interest in the 
notion of a private language revolves around the possibility of a private ostensive definition as 
envisaged in Section 258, however, just the questioning of the possibility of setting up a 
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 Cf. for example: ‘Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”’ (PI §217). 
124
 See also (o) from the list in Section 4, above. 
125
 See also: ‘I turn to stone, and my pain goes on. – What if I were mistaken, and it was no longer 
pain? —– But surely I can’t be mistaken here; it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain!’ (§288). 
Cf. (Baker 1990, [112–113]). 
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criterion might be of great significance. But as Section 290 (quoted above) is apt to demonstrate, 
this need not be the case. For example, such a person might also, reasonably, protest, ‘Well, I 
believe that this is the sensation S again’ (Wittgenstein in fact goes on to consider just this 
possible response in Section 260; and does it necessarily help if one’s interlocutor exclaims in 
response, ‘Perhaps you believe that you believe it!’ (§260)?). 
5. An understandable use and 6. The grammar of a sensation word. The first of Schroeder’s 
final two arguments consists in ‘drawing attention to an incompleteness, rather than an 
incorrigible flaw in the set-up of the private diary’ (Schroeder 2006, 216). Schroeder cites 
Section 270, where Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a possible function of the sign ‘S’ 
whereby we learn to correlate it with the rise of our blood-pressure as shown by a manometer 
whenever we have the sensation. Schroeder writes: ‘But any such further information that can 
make the use of the sign “S” understandable . . . will diminish its original privacy. . . . So the 
meaning of “S” will no longer be entirely incommunicable’ (2006, 216). — The second of 
Schroeder’s final two arguments could perhaps also be called ‘the argument from ordinary 
language’. Like Wittgenstein, Schroeder poses the question: ‘What reason have we for calling 
“S” the sign for a sensation?’ (§261). Then, in loose connection with Wittgenstein’s own 
remarks, Schroeder enumerates some interesting features of ordinary sensation words. For 
instance, bodily sensations usually have a location (like toothache, stomach ache, feeble limbs, 
etc.); furthermore, sensations normally have a degree of intensity and phenomenal qualities (a 
headache, for example, can be throbbing or piercing); sensations can moreover be pleasant or 
unpleasant, etc., etc. And Schroeder correctly concludes that, by every assimilation of the sign 
‘S’ to the ordinary grammar of sensation words, ‘its claim to absolute privacy is clearly 
relinquished’ (2006, 218). 
Now, both of these arguments are in principle perfectly acceptable. It just seems to me that, 
once again, there is more that needs to be said. For instance, Schroeder’s qualified conclusion 
concerning S’s being ‘no longer entirely incommunicable’ when associated with the rise of 
blood-pressure indicated by a manometer actually points to one further way to try to give sense 
to the idea of a private language which, alas, Schroeder does not consider. Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, explicitly discusses this possibility, which could perhaps aptly be described as a 
‘private aspect of our shared language’, in §§273–280.126 Thus, it is almost symbolical that, the 
conclusions of Schroeder’s two arguments mark really two points at which Wittgenstein’s 
investigation is just about to take a fresh turn, respectively. For, the question remains: what is 
‘absolute privacy’ supposed to mean here? And more generally: what could someone possibly 
mean by the notion of ‘a private language’? 
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 It is a curious fact that many commentators appear to avoid these sections in their expositions of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about ‘private language’ in Philosophical Investigations. 
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‘. . . that one human being can be a complete enigma to another.’ 
Just as none of Plato’s Socratic dialogues end with ‘a truth in words’ (Socrates and his 
interlocutors never end by saying ‘q.e.d.’), Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Investigations on 
‘private language’ do not ultimately tell us what a private language is, or is not (or could not be), 
either. Yet, just like in every Socratic dialogue, there is much to learn on the positive side from 
Wittgenstein’s remarks. I have stressed that whatever Wittgenstein’s ‘therapeutic’ intents, his 
philosophy is not therefore merely negative. The same holds for this special group of remarks 
about ‘private language’. Besides our getting to understand better the terrain surrounding the 
various inclinations we might feel to say something about the possibility of a ‘private language’ 
through considering their problematic consequences—as it were, dispelling the fog that is likely 
to surround one’s unreflective use of words such as ‘meaning’, ‘sensation’, ‘privacy’, ‘know’, 
‘name’, ‘object’, or ‘mind’ and thereby making us see more and see more clearly—what we can 
positively learn in engaging with these remarks may become clearest when looking at some of 
the few attempts made by Wittgenstein to help us to a glimpse of a possibly good and interest-
ing sense that someone might want to give to the idea of a ‘private language’. 
For example, the remarks in §§269, 273–280, 295 (cited above) and 303 once more illustrate 
Wittgenstein’s tendency to take seriously the person behind the philosophical idea, in that he 
honestly tries to understand what could be true in what is being said, although the expression of 
it might be, as usual in philosophical matters, somewhat complex, difficult, and potentially 
misleading. The most vivid example is perhaps the following: 
280. Someone paints a picture in order to show, for example, how he imagines a stage set. 
And now I say: “This picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or 
words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of 
information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for 
anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense 
in which the picture can’t do this for others.” – And what right have I to speak in this 
second case of a representation or piece of information – if these words were correctly 
used in the first case? (PI §280) 
First let us note that Wittgenstein is in no way explicitly dismissing the idea of such a private 
aspect of language (as one might call it). And for good reasons: after all, the particular 
phenomenon being described in Section 280 is surely familiar to many people: especially in art, 
but also in philosophy, we could often go on discussing a particular piece or question forever.
127
 
Even though we might agree on a large number of points, it seems there always remains an air 
of disagreement or misunderstanding. So why should we not use the expression ‘private 
language’ in speaking about this phenomenon, which Wittgenstein describes in Section 280? As 
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 As Socrates also notes in the Phaedrus, it seems characteristic of such notions as ‘just’ or ‘good’ 
that ‘we differ with one another and even with ourselves’ (263a) in thinking or conversing about them. 
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long as we are not confused about how we use the words that are involved, and do not infer 
something like ‘that, in reality, we could never possibly understand someone else the way we 
understand ourselves’, for instance, I do not see any problem, in principle, with giving this sense 
to the words ‘private language’—and neither, or so I argue, did Wittgenstein. 
There is a corresponding stretch of remarks, not from Philosophical Investigations but from 
a related typescript (formerly published as ‘Part II’ of the Investigations, now published under 
the name of ‘Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment’), which is apt to illustrate Wittgenstein’s 
interest in this thought. I quote at length: 
324. If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause, I do not think: all the same, his 
feelings are hidden from me. 
325. We also say of a person that he is transparent to us. It is, however, important as 
regards our considerations that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. 
One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; 
and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country’s language. One does not 
understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to 
themselves.) We can’t find our feet with them [German: Wir können uns nicht in sie 
finden]. 
326. “I can’t know what is going on in him” is, above all, a picture. It is the convincing 
expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not 
obvious. 
327. If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it. (PIF xi, 235e) 
It appears reasonable to assume that Wittgenstein speaks partly from his own experience in this 
second of the above-quoted sections (although, I should mention, this is by no means necessary 
for the following discussion). As we can read in many of the available biographical accounts, 
Wittgenstein’s life abroad, where he spent about half of his entire lifetime, made him frequently 
realise how two human beings can speak the same language and yet despite best efforts not 
understand each other; as it were, they feel that somehow they cannot play in tune with one 
another, even though they are playing one and the same song, from the same sheet of notes, that 
they are sharing, correctly, and each of them have known this song for all their life, and played 
it uncountable times, and both love it so dearly – yet something is lacking. ‘If a lion could talk, 
we wouldn’t be able to understand it’, summarises this unsettling experience, viz. that speaking 
the same language is sometimes not enough to achieve understanding. What I mean is, of course, 
not the kind of situation in which, like in politics, someone is consciously saying one thing and 
meaning another, using the loopholes of ambiguity and equivocation. What I mean is the kind of 
tragic not-understanding each other despite the fact that we have tried our earnest best to 
understand and make ourselves understood, but we could not and now we might have run out of 
words. 
And here we are finally full turn (in fact, almost home) from our somewhat lengthy journey 
with this present essay. We remember, for example, what Plato had Socrates say in conversation 
with Phaedrus about writing and philosophical understanding: that no one could really grasp the 
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meaning of one’s philosophical writing, except (perhaps) for oneself. However, we also saw 
that this is not an insurmountable problem. Usually, in conversation – and it may take hours, 
days, years, a life-time – we can come to understand (almost) everyone, if only we try hard and 
long enough. (Being in good practice, like Socrates, certainly helps.) We also know these 
wonderful moments of human understanding, when after a long and difficult conversation we 
finally feel that we deeply agree and understand each other—when we are able to finish each 
other’s sentences, sometimes better than we ourselves could have done. What I propose as the 
possible good sense one might want to give to the notion of a ‘private language’ can thus be 
seen to be connected to a problem that is really rather contingent (not, however, that this would 
make it any less difficult to deal with). It has to do with the medium of writing, with the 
abstractness of philosophy and with our modern lack of time. 
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Postscript 
In this way, then (as indicated towards the end of the final section, above), Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of a ‘private language’ in PI §§243 ff. can be seen to bear quite directly on the 
questions that have driven this essay all along, but especially on what is perhaps the most 
central question: what is the role of understanding each other in philosophy, especially in the 
form of philosophy that Socrates and Plato and Wittgenstein saw as being a worthwhile endeav-
our in the life of a human being?
128
 As we saw, for Socrates the mutual understanding between 
participants in a philosophical conversation played such an important and unique role for his 
philosophical work that he consequently refused to write any philosophy, since he believed it 
was only ‘in the living and breathing discourse’ of words spoken between human beings that 
real (philosophical) understanding could take place. Plato, as the Phaedrus shows perhaps most 
vividly, had similar reservations concerning the writing of philosophy. Still, as his dialogues 
provide solid proof of, he did seem to feel that there was a role for the medium of texts and 
writing in philosophical instruction. And, finally, Wittgenstein, nowadays (in)famous for his so-
called therapeutic approach to philosophy, also valued mutual understanding as an essential 
ingredient of philosophical understanding and clarity. A thorough appreciation of the role that 
mutual understanding plays in Wittgenstein’s later philosophical writing, but particularly in his 
‘book’ (Philosophical Investigations) can furthermore help us see how his philosophy was not 
wholly negative or destructive. For the only reason that we do not find positive take-home 
messages in his writings (however much we might be inclined to believe that we do) is that 
Wittgenstein also came to realise that real philosophical understanding, as such, cannot be 
lodged in a book; that the spirit cannot be made explicit, but the letter must be bent in order for 
the spirit to be able to enter. In other words, each one of us has to go our own way in coming to 
understand philosophically (although it is best, and perhaps most effective, to embark on this 
road with a companion – not those provided by Blackwell, Oxford or Cambridge, but a real 
person). Wittgenstein’s writing of Philosophical Investigations, as I have attempted in part to 
argue in the final one and a half sections (4 and 4.1) of this essay, can therefore be seen as an 
attempt, not merely to satisfy his own vanity (as he so often complained), but to allow as many 
individuals as possible to use his book in accordance with their own modes of understanding, to 
have something like a ‘private’ Socratic dialogue with it, and to thus achieve, through ‘reading’, 
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 There is a sense in which this entire essay can be read as a long commentary on these sections, 
something also expressed by Cavell in the following passage: ‘the recurrence of skeptical voices, and 
answering voices, struck me as sometimes strangely casual and sometimes strangely conclusive, as 
sometimes devious and sometimes definitive. I knew reasonably soon thereafter and reasonably well that 
my fascination with the Investigations had to do with my response to it as a feat of writing. It was some 
years before I understood it as what I came to think of as a discovery for philosophy of the problem of the 
other: and further years before these issues looked to me like functions of one another’ (Cavell 1979, xvi–
xvii). 
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against all the odds, genuine philosophical understanding. Having achieved this is what makes 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein’s masterpiece. 
So what, now, are the possible morals we could infer from all this rambling about this book? 
Should we all try to write like Wittgenstein, or else stop? I think that the answer to this last 
question should be, quite clearly, ‘No’. Here I am inclined to cite Stanley Cavell once more: ‘If 
philosophy is a direction of thought, a mode, an impulse, a motive, the worst thing that can 
happen to philosophy is that it be—not parodied, that may be a good thing that can happen to 
philosophy—but that it be faked’ (Cavell 1989, 60–61). On some reflection, the present piece of 
writing might be justifiably considered, in many ways, to be an ambivalent hybrid and thus, in 
many ways, certainly not an example of its own exemplar, and hence a failure. – On the other 
hand, however, the author’s intention may not have been to imitate in any straightforward way. 
I mentioned in the final section of the essay that I decided to discuss Severin Schroeder’s 
interpretation since it seems to me to be representative of the way in which contemporary 
readers are most inclined to read Wittgenstein’s Investigations. This obviously hangs together 
with the present realities of philosophical writing, in academia and especially in the Anglophone 
tradition.
129
 For, while many of the great philosophers of the past have shown considerable 
sensitivity with regard to such difficulties inherent in writing philosophical texts,
130
 it is strik-
ing—in fact, devastating—how little attention professional philosophers nowadays tend to pay 
to questions of this sort.
131
 This is certainly somehow dependent on the present socio-economic 
realities of philosophical writing. But I do not want to go into any detail here about the 
underlying mechanisms of our market society which have finally made academic philosophers 
into slaves of the publishing industry. Instead, since I find myself sitting behind my desk, as so 
many of us constantly and inevitably do, I would like to ask: what ought one to do, as a writing 
individual, in order to make this profession the genuinely inclusive activity that it should be? – 
To be clear, there are no easy ways to answer this question. However, first and foremost, I 
believe, we shall have to learn to ask this question seriously. Only then could we go about 
answering it. Or, better still, we could start trying out various formats and underexplored media 
(and interlocutors)—but in a manner as critical and as charitable as the morals of teaching and 
producing philosophy in the public realm will demand of us, once these are thoroughly 
recognised. 
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 See also (Nussbaum 1990, 3–10). 
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 At this point, perhaps most notably, inter alia: Socrates, Plato, Montaigne, Descartes, Berkeley, 
Hume, Hamann, Herder, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 
131
 Recent publications by Peter Hacker (2014) and Timothy Williamson (2015) might give some hope 
in this respect. But the curious fact remains that at least one of these two world-leading academic authors 
of philosophical prose tends to think of their dialogical writings as (merely) ‘entertaining’ pieces. 
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